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JUDICIAL BALANCING IN TIMES OF STRESS: 
COMPARING THE AMERICAN, BRITISH, AND 
ISRAELI APPROACHES TO THE 




In 2004, the highest court in three different countries, the United 
States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, handed down major decisions in 
cases regarding the war on terror.1  All these cases involved conflicts 
between liberty and security in the context of combating terrorism, and 
in all three countries the decisions were the product of judicial 
balancing.2  The factual settings of the cases varied significantly from 
one country to the next.  Two of the three American cases arose out of 
the war in Afghanistan undertaken to uproot Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
 
 *  Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law.  I wish to thank the participants at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center conference 
entitled “Terrorism, Globalism and the Rule of Law,” held July 18-22, 2005, for their invaluable 
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article.  I also thank Professor Bernhard 
Schlink for his incisive reading and helpful advice.  No one, but me, is responsible for any 
remaining errors.  Finally, I wish to thank the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy 
at Cardozo for funding a faculty summer research grant, which enabled me to complete this 
Article. 
 1 The U.S. cases are Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004); and Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).  The Israeli cases are HCJ 2056/04 Beit 
Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, [2004], available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/a28/04020560.a28.pdf [hereinafter Beit Sourik] 
and HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza 
Strip, [2004], available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/640/047/a03/04047640.a03.htm 
[hereinafter Physicians for Human Rights].  The United Kingdom case is A(FC) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.) (U.K.). 
 2 Consistent with the terminology used by many courts outside the United States, see, for 
example, The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.); Pharmacy Case, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 11, 1958, 7 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 379 (F.R.G.) (Germany); Hauer v. 
Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, (E.C.J.), the Israeli Supreme Court referred to the test it 
used in its two above mentioned decisions as a “proportionality test.”  For their part, the British 
Law Lords used both a “proportionality” test and “balancing.”  As will be discussed below, see 
discussion infra Part I.C, the American and British “balancing” approach and the Israeli and 
British “proportionality” analysis are not completely equivalent, but they largely overlap. 
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after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 
2001.  These two cases concerned individuals captured in Afghanistan 
who were being held indefinitely without charges either in the United 
States or in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on an American military base 
located there.3  The third American case concerned an American citizen 
arrested and held indefinitely on U.S. soil upon being suspected of 
involvement in an Al Qaeda terrorist plot.4  Of the two Israeli cases, one 
arose in connection with the building of a barrier on the West Bank by 
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to protect Israeli citizens from 
Palestinian suicide bombers,5 while the other involved the conduct by 
the IDF of military operations in Gaza “directed against the terrorist 
infrastructure” in that area.6  Finally, the British case was prompted by 
indefinite detention without charges of non-citizens suspected of having 
ties to terrorism who could not be deported to their countries of origin 
without violation of humanitarian laws because of the likelihood that 
they would be tortured upon arrival there.7 
Although all three countries were actively engaged in the war on 
terror at the times that their respective courts handed down the decisions 
mentioned above, each of the countries was confronting a markedly 
different situation from the others.  The United States had suffered a 
single-day coordinated terrorist attack that claimed around 3,000 lives 
on its territory on September 11, 2001.  It engaged thereafter in two 
foreign wars in far distant countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, which posed 
no apparent serious threats to America’s domestic security or territorial 
integrity.  In contrast, in Israel, between 2000 and 2004, there were 780 
terrorist attacks on Israeli soil collectively claiming 900 lives8—
proportionately the equivalent of 45,000 lives in the United States, 
given Israel’s population of 6 million versus the U.S.’s population of 
300 million.9  In contrast, the United Kingdom had not suffered a 
terrorist attack on its territory from September 2001 until the Law Lords 
issued their decision in December 2004.  Since then, however, British-
born citizens conducted terrorist attacks on London subways and buses 
 
 3 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (concerning U.S. citizen held in U.S. prison); Rasul, 542 U.S. 
at 470 (concerning foreign detainees held in Guantanamo). 
 4 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430. 
 5 See Beit Sourik, supra note 1, paras. 1-2. 
 6 Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 1, para. 1. 
 7 See A(FC) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 92-93 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 8 See Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 1. 
 9 Israel’s population is approximately 6 million.  See Israel Population, 
http://www.nationbynation.com/Israel/population.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).  The United 
States’s population is almost 300 million.  See U.S. and World Population Clock, 
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
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in July 2005.10  Approximately fifty United Kingdom citizens were 
killed in the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center in New 
York and the United Kingdom had feared ever since becoming a target 
of international terrorism, fears partially realized by the July 2005 
London attacks.  This fear has been fueled by the prominent role played 
by the United Kingdom in the U.S.-led coalition engaged in military 
operations in Iraq and by the presence within the United Kingdom of 
sizable numbers of citizens and aliens sympathetic to Al Qaeda’s cause. 
Notwithstanding these important differences among the three 
countries, they have all conducted the war on terror under conditions of 
stress rather than under conditions of crisis or emergency.  As will be 
discussed in Part I below, conditions of stress fall somewhere between 
ordinary conditions and conditions of crisis.  It is clear that in the 
context of the fear of terrorism and of the battle against it none of the 
three countries is living in ordinary times.  On the other hand, none of 
the three countries has been thrown into a state of crisis by its 
confrontation with terror.  For the United States, for example, the 
current threat posed by terror is not comparable to the Cuban missile 
crisis, when the Soviet Union and the United States were dangerously 
flirting with mutual nuclear annihilation.  Similarly, the United 
Kingdom’s confrontation with terror is not comparable to the 
experience of fighting virtually alone against the Nazis during part of 
World War II, where Great Britain faced a real risk of military defeat 
and subsequent subjugation of the British people to brutal Nazi 
occupation.  Finally, Palestinian suicide bombings in the past four years 
do not put Israel’s survival in question as did the 1948 war of 
independence or the 1967 or 1973 wars fought against several 
neighboring countries. 
In ordinary times, judicial balancing or proportionality analysis is 
common and widespread in dealing with conflicts between liberty and 
security, and more generally, between individual rights and important 
societal goals.11  In times of crisis, however, balancing becomes 
problematic and highly contested.  In some countries the constitution 
provides for invocation of a state of emergency that allows for 
suspension or derogation of fundamental rights.12  Even in the United 
States, where the Constitution does not provide for emergency powers, 
 
 10 On July 7, 2005, four British men of Pakistani origin set off three bombs on London 
subway trains and one bomb on a London double-decker bus, killing fifty-two and injuring seven 
hundred.  See Alan Cowell & Don van Natta, Jr., 4 From Britain Carried Out Terror Blasts, 
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A1.  Two weeks later, on July 21, 2005, bombs on three 
more subways and one more double-decker bus failed to detonate.  See Alan Cowell, Bombs Set 
at 4 London Sites, but Fail to Explode, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at A1. 
 11 See cases cited supra note 2. 
 12 See cases cited supra note 2; see, e.g., 1958 French Constitution, art. 16. 
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the right of habeas corpus can be suspended in a crisis13 and Presidents 
have de facto increased their powers in times of war or emergency.14  
Moreover, of the three different positions on how to deal with conflicts 
between liberty and security in times of crisis that have dominated the 
debate in the United States,15 two appear to do away altogether with 
judicial balancing.  The three positions are: (1) “executive 
unilateralism,” which favors allowing complete discretion to the 
executive branch without any oversight from any other institution,16 (2) 
“civil libertarian maximalism,” which requires the same judicial 
balancing in times of crisis as in ordinary times,17 and (3) a “process-
based institutional approach” requiring coordination between Congress 
and the President.18  Positions (1) and (3) involve no judicial balancing, 
and (1) may require no balancing at all,19 whereas (3) relies on some 
kind of non-judicial balancing, namely on “checks and balances” 
between the legislative branch and the executive branch.20 
Position (2) is not persuasive in the context of a crisis to the extent 
that it seems counterintuitive that liberties need be just as extensively 
protected at times when the nation’s survival is in peril as in ordinary 
times.  What about during times of stress?  Does this depend on whether 
the differences between ordinary times and times of crisis are viewed 
primarily in quantitative rather than qualitative terms—in other words, 
in terms of ascribing different weights to the various interests that must 
be weighed against one another rather than in terms of categorical 
distinctions calling for altogether different approaches? 
The decisions in all three countries were the product of judicial 
balancing, but some of them also prompted concurring and dissenting 
 
 13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (permitting suspension of habeas corpus in cases of 
invasion or insurrection). 
 14 See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, 11-132 
(expanded ed. 1976) (1951). 
 15 For a thoughtful account of the various approaches developed during the course of 
American history, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pilides, Emergency Contexts Without 
Emergency Powers: The United States’ Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2 
INT’L. J. CONST. L. 296 (2004). 
 16 Id. at 297. 
 17 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531-33 (2004); see also Cass Sunstein, Minimalism 
at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 49 (distinguishing between “a natural security maximalism” and 
“liberty maximalism,” which roughly correspond respectively to positions (1) and (2) above). 
 18 See Issacharoff & Pilides, supra note 15, at 297. 
 19 Whether or not position (1) requires any balancing depends on whether one regards the 
Executive Power in terms of its duty to uphold constitutional rights while pursuing security, see 
infra Part II, pp. 2109-10, or exclusively as devoted to safeguarding security. 
 20 Legislative power can provide a “check and balance” on executive power to the extent that 
the two have different institutional interests or political objectives.  Accordingly, whereas judicial 
balancing is supposed to rely on some notion of proportionality, see infra Part II, a “balance” 
between legislative and executive power need not relate in any way to proportionality. 
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opinions relying on categorical approaches.21  Furthermore, some of the 
judges involved regarded the relevant controversies as arising under 
conditions of crisis, others regarded them as arising under conditions of 
stress, and yet others regarded them as arising under close to ordinary 
conditions.22 
To compound these difficulties, collectively the six decisions make 
use of three different legal paradigms to deal with the various conflicts 
between liberty and security presented for adjudication.  These 
paradigms are: (1) the “law of war paradigm,” (2) the “criminal law 
paradigm,” and (3) the “police power law paradigm.”23  No 
straightforward correlation ties the three conditions described above to 
these three legal paradigms.  Nevertheless, the law of war paradigm 
seems most compatible with conditions of crisis, whereas the other two 
paradigms seem best suited for ordinary times. 
The thesis defended in this Article is that none of the six decisions 
deals with the conflict between liberty and security in the context of the 
war on terror in the best possible way.  It is necessary to treat the war on 
terror, absent extraordinary circumstances, as occurring under 
conditions of stress.  Moreover, these conditions ought to be correlated, 
all other things being equal, to a new legal paradigm: the “war-on-terror 
law paradigm.”  Under this thesis, judicial balancing has an important 
role to play in the optimal resolution of war on terror cases.  That role is 
not exclusive but circumscribed by shared institutional responsibility 
between legislative, executive and judicial power.  Finally, reliance on 
conditions of stress and on the war-on-terror law paradigm makes for an 
appropriately calibrated judicial balancing.  In contrast, as we shall see, 
the American cases seem to place too much weight on security or too 
little on liberty;24 the Israeli cases, conversely, too little weight on 
security;25 and the British case, falling somewhere between the 
American and the Israeli, seems to reach the right result, but not 
necessarily because of any principled use of judicial balancing.26 
To elaborate the above thesis, this Article proceeds as follows.  
Part I sets the theoretical framework by focusing on four issues: the 
distinctions between conditions of stress, ordinary conditions, and 
conditions of crisis; the distinctions between the three existing 
paradigms of law that figure in the six decisions under consideration; 
the relationship between proportionality and judicial balancing; and the 
prevalent background conditions for each of the six cases, in order to set 
 
 21 See infra pp. 2112-22. 
 22 See infra text accompanying notes 235-241. 
 23 See infra Part I.B. 
 24 See infra Part II. 
 25 See infra Part III. 
 26 See infra Part IV. 
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the parameters of relevant comparison.  Part II examines the American 
cases, Part III the Israeli cases, and Part IV the British case.  Part V 
compares American balancing, Israeli proportionality analysis, and their 
British counterparts.  Finally, Part VI explores the optimal role for 
judicial balancing consistent with the thesis that links times of stress and 
the war-on-terror law paradigm. 
 
I.     THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
How to handle the conflict between liberty and security in the war 
on terror and how to do it through judicial balancing depend on the 
characterization of the prevailing conditions, and on whether terrorists 
are conceived as criminals who must be prosecuted or as enemy 
warriors who must be killed or captured and detained until the end of 
hostilities.  As will be demonstrated below,27 the six decisions are not 
consistent in their dealings with these issues.  They are often at odds 
with one another and even, at times, seemingly internally 
contradictory.28 
The theoretical framework outlined below is meant to provide the 
critical tools necessary for cogent analysis of the existing jurisprudence 
and for elaboration of the thesis presented in this Article. 
 
A.     Times of Stress vs. Ordinary Times and Times of Crisis 
 
Times of stress are neither ordinary times nor times of crisis.  In 
the context of a crisis, be it military, economic, social, or natural, the 
head of government may be entitled to proclaim exceptional powers and 
to suspend constitutional rights, including political rights.  In an acute 
crisis, the polity is singularly focused on survival, and all other political 
concerns and objectives recede into the background.29  In contrast, in 
ordinary times, the polity can readily absorb the full impact of the give 
and take of everyday politics, and constitutional rights ought to be 
protected to their fullest possible extent. 
 
 27 See, e.g., Hamdi as discussed infra Part II, pp. 2113-22 (Eight justices rejected the Bush 
Administration’s position, but some did so based on the law of war paradigm, while others relied 
on the criminal law paradigm.). 
 28 See infra Parts II, III. 
 29 The grant and duration of exceptional emergency powers are problematic not in relation to 
their proper use as means to combat threats to the life of the polity, but in relation to the potential 
for abuse in the invocation or prolongation of such powers.  See Bruce Ackerman, The 
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1040 (2004). 
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Times of stress differ from those of crisis primarily in terms of the 
severity, intensity, and duration of the respective threats involved.  The 
line between the two may be difficult to draw, but a less severe, less 
intense, and more durable threat is likely to give rise to times of stress 
whereas a severe, intense, concentrated threat, of relatively shorter 
duration, is likely to provoke a crisis.  For example, a foreign military 
invasion or a widespread domestic insurrection is likely to provoke a 
crisis.  On the other hand, the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against 
New York City on September 11th, 2001—which involved threats, 
perceived threats, launching a “war on terror” fought mainly in far away 
countries, arrest and detention of potential terrorists, but no further 
terrorist attack on the United States as of the time of this writing—has 
produced times of stress rather than times of crisis.30 
The distinction between ordinary times, times of crisis, and times 
of stress can be further elaborated consistent with a pluralist conception 
of the polity where politics looms as the ongoing confrontation between 
self and other.  In a pluralist polity, different groups—ethnic, religious, 
or ideological—and different interests compete for power and scarce 
political goods.  Such competition, moreover, can be characterized as 
struggles between self and other.  In ordinary times, conflicts between 
self and other do not threaten the unity of the polity and find resolution, 
or at least confinement, within the existing constitutional, institutional, 
and political framework.  Thus, in spite of the fact that a number of 
struggles relating to individual or group identity and to the 
apportionment of benefits and burdens throughout the polity split the 
citizenry into a multiplicity of selves pitted against numerous others, the 
common self that binds all citizens to the unity of the polity remains 
glued together and shows no danger of unraveling.  In ordinary times, 
neither self nor other may be fully satisfied with their fate and may be 
likely to struggle continuously to ameliorate their respective positions.  
Neither of them, however, is likely to become so dissatisfied with his or 
her status or with the existing institutional framework for processing 
conflicts as to want to withdraw from the polity. 
Times of crisis, in contrast, occur when the common identity or the 
very life of the polity are in imminent peril.  The cause of the peril may 
be external, as in the case of a foreign war, or internal, as in the case of 
civil war or violent secession.  In times of crisis, the conception of the 
 
 30 It is important, however, to distinguish the long term aftermath from the immediate impact 
and short term consequences of a terrorist attack.  For example, the day of the September 11th 
attacks, which resulted in around three thousand deaths, and subsequent days in which the 
American nation had to cope with the shock of the sudden and unexpected attacks and with the 
prospect of imminent future attacks, can be characterized fairly as a time of crisis.  The long 
period of disquiet that followed those first few weeks, however, seems better described as one of 
stress than of crisis. 
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good of self or other is so little integrated or accommodated within the 
polity that all possible institutional resolutions of the conflict between 
self and other will strike one or both of them as deeply insufficient, 
unsatisfactory, and unjust. 
Times of stress stand halfway between ordinary times and times of 
crisis.  In times of stress, there is less extensive and less successful 
accommodation and integration of significantly represented conceptions 
of the good within the polity.  Self and other are less likely than in 
ordinary times to consider institutional processes of conflict resolution 
to be just or fair.  The identity or unity of the common self that is 
supposed to bind together the citizenry is not disintegrating, but it is 
destabilized and under various pressures.  Whereas a conventional war 
may cause a crisis, terrorism and the war on terror seem more likely to 
create stress.  Indeed, unlike a military invasion, terrorist acts are likely 
to be sporadic and widespread, causing more psychological than 
physical harm.  Having terrorists hidden within the polity’s population 
is undoubtedly unnerving and can easily lead to overreactions, undue 
suppression of fundamental rights, or exacerbation of ethnic or racial 
prejudice such that certain selves and the conceptions of the good they 
endorse may become increasingly unhinged.  At some point, erosion of 
accommodation of certain conceptions of the good may place increasing 
strain on the working unity of the polity’s citizenry.  In short, both the 
threat posed by the terrorist—be he or she a foreign or a domestic one—
and the dangers posed by overreaction may fray the common glue that 
binds the polity together.  Thus, the dangers looming on the horizon in 
times of stress may not be very different in nature than their 
counterparts present in times of crisis.  Nevertheless, in times of stress, 
these dangers are markedly less imminent and less intense. 
That the current war on terror gives rise to conditions of stress 
rather than of crisis is well captured in the following passage from Lord 
Hoffman’s opinion in the A(FC) case: 
[The United Kingdom] is a nation that has been tested in adversity, 
which has survived physical destruction and catastrophic loss of life.  
I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to 
kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the nation.  
Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is no 
doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda.  The Spanish people have not 
said that what happened in Madrid, hideous crime as it was, 
threatened the life of their nation.  Their legendary pride would not 
allow it.  Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our 
institutions of government or our existence as a civil community.31 
 
 31 A(FC) v. Sec’y of State of the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 132 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (Lord Hoffman, concurring). 
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B.     The Criminal Law, Law of War, and Police Power Law Paradigms 
 
Both ordinary criminals and soldiers in the armies of foreign 
enemies can pose threats to the lives and security of the members of a 
polity.  The law, however, treats suspected criminals and captured 
enemy soldiers very differently.  Following arrest, suspected criminals 
must be charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced before they can be 
legitimately confined to prison for a determinate maximum period of 
time.  Moreover, in constitutional democracies, such as the United 
States for example, criminal defendants are afforded certain categorical 
constitutionally protected rights, such as the right against self-
incrimination,32 the right to counsel,33 and the right to confront 
witnesses that testify against them,34 to secure an acceptable minimum 
of procedural fairness.  Such rights as well as other norms and 
protections, such as the requirement that the state prove its case against 
the accused “beyond a reasonable doubt,” frame the “criminal law 
paradigm.” 
In contrast, captured foreign enemy soldiers who are not in 
violation of the laws of war can only be detained consistent with 
applicable norms of the international law so as to prevent them from 
further participation in the military conflict on the side of the captor’s 
foreign enemies.35  Such prisoners of war must be treated humanely, are 
exempt from all but a minimum of clearly defined interrogation, and are 
to be released without undue delay upon termination of hostilities.36  In 
short, these as well as other legally binding norms that set the legitimate 
bounds for the treatment of prisoners of war in the context of 
conventional military hostilities among two or more nation-states 
circumscribe the “law of war paradigm.” 
In addition to requiring neutralization of criminals and foreign 
soldiers fighting against the country’s armed forces, the security of that 
country’s citizenry may require further restraints impinging on the 
citizenry as a whole or on some distinct groups within it.  For example, 
a city plagued by rampant youth-gang violence may improve security 
for its inhabitants by imposing a general curfew or one confined to all 
residents below a certain age.  More generally, special security needs 
arising because of certain specific threats—for instance, threats posed 
 
 32 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 33 See id. amend. VI. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 36 Id. arts. 13, 17, and 118. 
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by terrorists, the spread of deadly contagious disease, a natural disaster, 
organized crime—call for government measures for the protection of 
the citizenry that are bound to impinge on the protection or exercise of 
certain fundamental rights, such as freedom of movement or assembly, 
privacy, etc.  In these circumstances, the constitutional state must seek 
to harmonize liberty and security through a balancing process.  The 
legal-constitutional underpinnings of such a balancing process as well 
as the specific legal norms it engenders give shape to the “police power 
law paradigm.” 
In its initial reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration 
seemingly could not make up its mind concerning whether the 
terrorists’ acts were acts of war by a transnational state-sponsored and  
-supported organized terrorist network, or the criminal acts of Osama 
Bin-Laden and several dozen co-conspirators.37  Similarly, the 
American and British war on terror judicial decisions examined below 
do not appear consistent in their handling of the distinction between 
crime and war.  Moreover, some of the judges involved treated issues 
arising out of the war on terror as falling under the criminal law 
paradigm while other judges tackled these same issues as if they fitted 
neatly within the law of war paradigm.  As the following analysis of 
these cases will demonstrate, neither of these two paradigms is 
satisfactory for dealing with cases pitting liberty against security in the 
context of the war on terror. 
For their part, the two Israeli cases deal with restrictions on the 
liberties of the civilian populations in the occupied territories in the 
West Bank and Gaza.  These restrictions were meant to enhance the 
security of the Israeli citizenry against acts of terror, by means of both 
defensive—the building of a separation barrier involving walls, fences, 
etc., in the West Bank—and offensive—chasing terrorists and 
destroying homes to frustrate arms smuggling from Egypt in Gaza—
military operations.38  Notwithstanding that these operations were 
military in nature and that they were conducted in the context of the war 
on terror, the Israeli Supreme Court treated the two cases it decided as if 
they belonged to the police power law paradigm.  As will be explained 
below, this paradigm is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of balancing 
liberty and security in the context of the effect of military actions on 
civilian bystanders in the theater of the war on terror.  Ultimately, all 
 
 37  See generally George Fletcher’s observation that following September 11, 2001, the Bush 
Administration could not decide whether the attacks in New York and Washington amounted to a 
“collective crime of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, in which case war is the proper response, or the 
individual crime of Osama bin Laden and other[s,] . . . in which case a criminal prosecution is the 
correct action.”  George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution, THE AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, 
at 26. 
 38 See infra Part III. 
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three paradigms used in the six cases under consideration are wanting in 
the context of the war on terror, hence calling for the articulation of a 




C.     Proportionality and Balancing 
 
In all three jurisdictions judicial balancing played a key role in the 
disposition of the claims arising in the context of the war on terror.  The 
Israeli Supreme Court applied a proportionality test, the Law Lords 
relied on both proportionality and balancing, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court used balancing.39  Proportionality and balancing are not 
synonymous, but they seem to overlap significantly, particularly since 
balancing proper forms part of proportionality tests such as that used by 
the Israeli Court.40 
On first impression, balancing in relation to conflicts between 
liberty and security seems simple and straightforward enough.  Both 
liberty and security are social goods, and the pursuit of one sometimes 
comes into conflict with the realization of the other.  When the pursuit 
of liberty threatens security or vice versa, the equilibrium between the 
two must be reestablished by sufficiently restricting the threat to allow 
for an adequate level of realization of the threatened social good.  
Consistent with that endeavor, the cost due to the burden imposed on 
the impinging social good must be weighed against the benefit that 
results for the threatened social good.  Furthermore, from an 
institutional standpoint, the legislature and/or the executive power is 
responsible for devising measures designed to cope with the relevant 
threat.  The judiciary, in turn, is charged with determining whether 
implementation of such measures is compatible with maintaining a 
suitable equilibrium between the two social goods involved, by 
weighing the benefits the measures in question confer on one social 
good against the costs that such measures impose on the other social 
good. 
Judicial balancing would work best and be most transparent if the 
social goods subjected to balancing were both quantifiable and 
comparable.  Thus, if total liberty weighed as much in units of good as 
total security; and if each unit of added cost or benefit to liberty would 
be the equivalent to the correlative unit with respect to security; and 
finally, if the aggregate of liberty and security were always zero-sum; 
 
 39 See supra note 2. 
 40 See infra Part III. 
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then judicial balancing could be thoroughly principled and accurate as 
well as completely transparent.  Actually, however, judicial balancing 
involving liberty and security is anything but simple, straightforward, or 
transparent.  The benefits of liberty or security may not be quantifiable, 
and even if quantifiable, they may not be comparable.  Finally, it is 
highly questionable that the relation between the two is a zero-sum one: 
most likely, there is no liberty without security, and security without 
liberty is not a worthy pursuit. 
A further objection against balancing liberty against security stems 
from the fact that liberty interests are, to a significant degree, protected 
as constitutional rights—e.g., freedom of speech, of assembly, against 
arbitrary detention—whereas security interests constitute, to a large 
extent, a collective social good.  Consistent with this, if constitutional 
liberty rights could be simply weighed against non-constitutional 
interests, such as a societal interest in maximizing security, they would 
fall victim to ordinary legislative policy-making, which consists of 
working out tradeoffs among competing collective interests.41  To avoid 
this, constitutional rights may be exempted from weighing and only 
subject to categorical limitations—e.g., pornography is not speech, 
speech can only be prohibited if it incites to violence—or following 
Dworkin, they may be subjected to weighing, but susceptible to being 
outweighed only by the most weighty social policy goals.42  In other 
words, in Dworkin’s view, limitations of constitutional rights can only 
be justified if their costs to rights holders are far outweighed by the 
benefit to be produced through the institution of pressing social policy. 
These last observations suggest that the conflict between liberty 
and security may not be susceptible to resolution through simple 
balancing, though it may be amenable to some kind of comparative 
weighing with some handicapping of the weights of non-constitutional 
interests as against constitutional interests.  Such handicapping can be 
given concrete content—i.e., by how much must pressing social policy 
benefits outweigh correlative costs to constitutional interests—by 
recourse to the concept of proportionality. 
From a theoretical standpoint, the concept of proportionality can be 
traced back to Aristotle’s conception of justice and equality, which 
requires that equals be treated equally and unequals unequally.43  
Treating equals unequally or unequals equally is disproportionate, as is 
treating unequals more unequally than they are unequal.44  From the 
 
 41 For a general critique of judicial balancing in constitutional adjudication, see T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
 42 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 92, 95-96 (1977). 
 43 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V (Martin Ostwald trans., Prentice Hall 
1962). 
 44 For example, if stealing $100 is punishable by ten days in prison and stealing $300 by 
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standpoint of the application of a proportionality standard to resolve 
conflicts between constitutional rights and social policies for the 
collective good, on the other hand, two factors loom as paramount: (1) 
constitutional rights and social policies embodied in legislation or 
executive decrees are of unequal value such that tradeoffs based on a 
simple calculus of utilities would be disproportionate; and (2) even 
when a particular social policy is of such vast importance that curtailing 
conflicting constitutional rights would not be disproportionate—for 
example, when an executive decree issued in the context of a struggle 
for national survival during an emergency partially restricts freedom of 
movement and assembly—the resulting limitations on, or suspensions 
of, the constitutional rights involved must not be themselves 
disproportionate.  In other words, even when it is not disproportionate to 
limit a constitutional right in the pursuit of a vitally important collective 
end, the means employed to that end should not impinge on the right at 
stake more than is necessary to achieve the end. 
Consistent with the first of the factors above, proportionality in 
relation to constitutional rights requires treating these rights and 
conflicting collective goods as unequals.  How unequal the rights and 
goods must be treated so that they are proportionately rather than 
disproportionately unequal cannot be determined without reference to 
substantive normative criteria that lie outside of the realm of 
proportionality.  For example, racist speech is likely to be deeply 
offensive to a large majority within the polity, but mere discomfort with 
it, standing alone, would not justify its suppression.  On the other hand, 
in some countries it is constitutional—and hence deemed 
proportional—to prohibit racist speech that incites racial hatred, 
whereas in the United States, only speech that incites racial violence 
may be thus prohibited.45  Assuming the racist’s right to communicate 
racist views and the discomfort of the audience reached by such views 
to involve equivalent costs and benefits absent the input of 
constitutional considerations; and assuming that incitement to violence 
imposes a greater collective cost on the polity than does incitement to 
hatred;46 then limiting free speech because of discomfort would be 
disproportionate.  However, whether either incitement to hatred or 
 
thirty days, it is disproportionate to punish stealing $200 by a year in prison. 
 45 Compare The Queen v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (upholding criminal 
conviction of high school teacher who taught anti-Semitic propaganda to his students) with Collin 
v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (holding that proposed Neo-
Nazi march in Nazi military uniforms including swastika in suburb heavily populated by Jewish 
Holocaust survivors does not amount to incitement to violence and hence cannot be prohibited). 
 46 This assumption is by no means self-evident.  Arguably, incitement to hatred is in the long 
run as, or more, pernicious than incitement to violence as it may spread undetected evils that may 
prove eventually more destructive of a polity’s social fabric. 
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incitement to violence or else both of these would render such 
limitations disproportionate would depend on values extrinsic to 
proportionality.  Such values may be embodied in a constitutional text,47 
found in the collective identity of a polity,48 or elaborated by judges in 
the course of adjudicating constitutional claims.49 
Consistent with the second factor listed above, on the other hand, 
proportionality concerns the means employed to achieve 
constitutionally permissible ends.  In this context, proportionality 
requires a “fit” between means and ends.  When some important 
collective objective justifies limitation of some constitutional right, the 
permissible intrusion on that right should be the minimum possible 
consistent with achieving the objective.  A perfect fit is achieved when 
the right-restricting means to a permissible end are neither over-
inclusive—they restrict no one who does not threaten achievement of 
the relevant end—nor under-inclusive—they do not fail to restrict those 
who would otherwise frustrate achievement of the aforesaid end.  
Moreover, were a perfect fit possible, the proportionality of means 
would involve neither comparison nor weighing, but only fine tuning to 
come into full compliance with the requirement to avoid all over- or 
under-inclusiveness. 
In the real world, however, it is rarely, if ever, possible to achieve a 
perfect fit.  For example, if one could predict with accuracy who will 
perpetrate a terrorist act unless restrained, it would be possible to assure 
security from terrorism by means of restrictions on all those and only 
those determined to carry out terrorist acts.  But since that is impossible, 
the best possible fit is bound to be one that is both under- and over-
inclusive, one that will not sufficiently restrict all would-be terrorists 
and that will inevitably target some who would never engage in terrorist 
acts. 
 
 47 See, e.g., Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects 
freedom of expression but allows for such “restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, or 
public safety . . . .”  European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221.  ECHR rights are formally treaty-based ones, but they are nonetheless the functional 
equivalents of constitutional rights.  See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2003).   
 48 The difference between the Canadian and American treatment of hate speech, see supra 
note 45, may be due to the contrast between Canadian multiculturalism and American 
individualism.  See MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND 
POLITICS 186-87 (1998). 
 49 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that limitation of freedom of speech cannot be 
justified unless in furtherance of a “compelling” state interest.  See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 
U.S. 191 (1992).  Similarly, racial classifications cannot be upheld absent compliance with a 
“strict scrutiny test.”  This test requires that there be a compelling state interest and the means 
used in pursuit of that interest be “necessary.”  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944). 
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In our imperfect world, the best fit is one that, though over- and 
under-inclusive, is nonetheless least restrictive of liberty and equality 
rights.  Indeed, all relevant rights in relation to the war on terror and to 
the six cases examined below, namely, besides liberty and equality 
rights proper, due process rights, habeas corpus rights, privacy rights 
and the right to use and enjoy one’s property, are at a higher level of 
abstraction reducible to liberty and/or equality rights.50  Moreover, 
liberty and equality rights are sometimes complementary and sometimes 
in conflict with one another.  For example, if most international 
terrorists happen to be Muslim, then imposing restrictions on the rights 
of Muslims alone may be less restrictive from the standpoint of liberty 
than extending such restrictions to all persons within the polity.  But 
since the vast majority of Muslims have no ties to terrorism, imposing 
the restrictions on them as a group would disproportionately impinge on 
their rights to equality. 
A proportionate fit in an imperfect world, therefore, is one that is 
least practically restrictive of liberty and equality rights, and that strikes 
a balance between restrictions on liberty rights and those on equality 
rights when the two are in conflict.  To perform these tasks, moreover, 
requires comparing alternative means to determine which provide a 
better fit, and weighing the costs of restrictions on liberty against those 
on equality to strike a proper balance and to avoid excessive restrictions 
on either of them. 
In short, the first factor of proportionality involves balancing, but it 
is balancing on a scale that is weighted in favor of constitutional rights.  
The second factor is likely to include comparisons of costs and benefits 
of alternative means to the same end, but these are unlikely to involve 
straightforward balancing in as much as they relate to tradeoffs between 
restrictions on liberty and restrictions on equality for purposes of 
achieving something else, such as, in the cases that concern us here, 
security.  Balancing proper, however, has a place within broader 
proportionality analysis.  Such balancing is appropriate in two kinds of 
situations: those involving direct conflicts between two rights; and those 
relating to the uncertainties surrounding the likelihood that, and degree 
to which, legislative or executive means will significantly advance a 
collective end that is of such great importance as to justify some 
limitations on constitutional rights. 
In the case of a conflict between liberty and equality in the pursuit 
of security, the rights are pitted against one another indirectly.  The 
 
 50 For example, privacy involves liberty to make decisions within the sphere of intimate 
decisions, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), while dignity requires both liberty 
to make choices for oneself and equality inasmuch as treatment of any person as an inferior 
results in a deprivation of dignity. 
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object is to achieve security without undue impingements on liberty or 
equality and without disproportionate sacrifice of one to the other.  The 
primary goal, however, is the achievement of security with the least 
possible overall limitation on rights, and that goal may well be best 
achieved with a greater limitation on equality than on liberty or vice 
versa.  In a direct conflict, in contrast, benefits and burdens related to 
one right are measured exclusively against those pertaining to another 
conflicting right and the resolution of the conflict in question is properly 
reached through balancing proper.  For example, if a journalist’s 
freedom of the press right clashes with a private person’s privacy right, 
as where the journalist wants to publish a story about that person’s 
intimate life, the burden on freedom of the press that prohibition of 
publication would entail would have to be weighed directly against the 
burden on privacy that such publication would cause. 
Concerning the second situation identified above, the probability 
that a particular means will lead to the achievement of a targeted end 
plays an important role in determining proportionality and often calls 
for balancing proper.  For example, capture and detention of a person 
who one knows with one hundred percent certainty is about to detonate 
a dirty bomb in the center of a city that would cause at least 100,000 
deaths would provide a huge boost to security.  In that case, the benefit 
to security far outweighs any corresponding burden on liberty.  But 
what if there is only one chance in one thousand that the person in 
indefinite detention is a would-be bomber?  And what if the chance of 
any such bomb’s detonating and causing serious casualties is only one 
in ten thousand?  More generally, are significant restrictions on 
everyone’s liberty in order to be in a slightly stronger position in the 
war on terror justified assuming that, at worst, terrorism will cause a 
number of fatalities amounting to a fraction of those due to highway 
accidents? 
To answer these questions properly, the gravity of a threat to 
security must be measured in relation to its degree of probability and 
any relevant net decrease in liberty must be weighed against the 
corresponding net increase in security—i.e., the aimed level of 
increased security discounted by the probability of its achievement.  
Thus, actual achievement of collective security may be proportionate to 
even extensive limitation of rights.  For example, under conditions of 
crisis in the face of a foreign armed invasion, considerations of national 
security in the struggle for survival would justify extensive curtailment 
of constitutional rights.  In contrast, a slight increase in security in 
ordinary times may not suffice to justify any curtailment of such rights.  
Furthermore, even if it is stipulated that the war on terror involves 
weighty security objectives that justify significant restrictions on 
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constitutional rights, policies that would only marginally improve 
security against terrorists would be outweighed by any significant 
corresponding burden on liberty rights.  And, conversely, policies that 
would in all likelihood dramatically improve security would justify 
substantial limitations on such rights. 
In the last analysis, proportionality analysis comprises measuring, 
“fitting,” comparing and balancing in relation to normative standards or 
values that transcend proportionality itself.  Responsibility for 
proportionality can be entrusted to legislators, members of the executive 
branch or to judges, or it can be apportioned among all of them.  How 
much of proportionality analysis and balancing is left to judges depends 
on many factors, including the particular constitutional order involved 
and the particular nature of the legislation and/or executive decrees at 
stake.  Furthermore, how much of, and what kind of, proportionality 
analysis and balancing should be optimally left to judges is also context-
dependent, as will be illustrated by examination of the cases below.  
Finally, when proportionality standards have been set by the legislature 
and when balancing is embodied in legislation, whether ordinary or 
constitutional, a judge applying such legislation or evaluating it in 
connection with a constitutional challenge may be pretty much limited 
to performing a categorical determination.51  Moreover, whether 
proportionality or balancing is factored into particular constitutional or 
legislative provisions is not always clear.  For example, are the 
constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants under the U.S. 
Constitution the product of balancing the liberty and dignity interests of 
individuals against the security and public order interests of the polity?  
Or, are they the expression of a categorical protection of individual 
liberty and dignity regardless of consequences? 
 
D.     Background Conditions: Contrasting the War on Terror in the 
United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom 
 
As noted at the outset, the factual circumstances of the cases in the 
three relevant jurisdictions were quite varied, as were the experiences 
with terrorism of each of the three countries.52  Moreover, at least from 
 
 51 A clear example of such categorical determination is provided by Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion in the Hamdi case.  See infra Part II, p. 2120.  As Justice Scalia sees it, the 
balance between liberty interests protected through the right of habeas corpus as against collective 
security interests are balanced within the U.S. Constitution itself in as much as the latter 
prescribes criteria for when habeas corpus claims should prevail against conflicting security 
claims, and in as much as it specifies the conditions under which the right to habeas corpus may 
be suspended.  See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 52 See supra Introduction, pp. 2085-87. 
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a formal standpoint, the legal issues differed significantly from one 
country to the next.  The U.S. cases dealt mainly with the constitutional 
rights of persons being detained for long and indeterminate periods;53 
the Israeli cases with the rights of Palestinian civilians under the 
international law of occupation and Israeli administrative law in the 
context of Israeli military operations in the occupied territories;54 and 
the British case, with the rights of detained foreign nationals who could 
not be deported to their home countries under the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights 
Act of 1998 granting the ECHR domestic effect.55  Given these 
differences, it is necessary to take a closer look at the context of 
terrorism in each country to establish suitable parameters of 
comparison. 
Besides the differences in the number of terrorist incidents noted 
above—one for the United States, 780 for Israel and none for the United 
Kingdom at the time of the Law Lords’ decision (but two since)—and 
the proportionately greater magnitude of casualties in Israel than in the 
United States—fifteen times higher in proportion to total population56—
there is another important difference between the three countries.  
Palestinian terrorism arises in the context of a long-standing conflict 
between two neighboring peoples involving an occupation and 
vehemently disputed territorial claims.  Al Qaeda-led or -inspired 
terrorism against the United States and the United Kingdom, in contrast, 
originates in distant places such as Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia and 
appears to be driven by a virulent strand of religious fundamentalism.57  
Thus, in Israel it is the means by which Palestinians carry out their 
struggle—suicide bombings that target civilians within Israel’s pre-1967 
borders—rather than the struggle itself that are shocking and utterly 
unacceptable.58  In the United States, however, both the means and ends 
 
 53 See infra Part II. 
 54 See infra Part III. 
 55 See infra Part IV. 
 56 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
 57 The 2005 London attacks present another variant.  These were apparently the work of 
domestic residents inspired by a virulent foreign ideology.  See Tod Robberson, How are 
Radicals Reeling in Brits?  As Angry Young Muslims Fall Under Spell, Officials Set Sights on 
‘Preachers of Hate’, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 16, 2005, at 1A. 
 58 This last statement is not meant to convey any moral or political judgment regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Instead the statement seeks to underscore that even from a subjective 
Israeli standpoint the political conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is an accepted fact of 
life, with Israelis divided along a political spectrum that ranges from some who want to make no 
territorial concessions to the Palestinians to some who favor dismantling all settlements in the 
West Bank and Gaza, as well as returning Israel to its pre-1967 borders.  See, e.g., Louisa Brooke, 
Politics and The Palestinian Issue, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2683613.stm.  On the other hand, there is a strong 
consensus among Israelis that suicide bombings are completely unacceptable and utterly 
  
2006] JUDICIAL BALANCING  2097 
 
of Al Qaeda-led terrorism loom as largely incomprehensible and 
absolutely unacceptable.59 
When the differences concerning the frequency of terrorist attacks 
and concerning the socio-political context in which terrorism arises60 
are added up, they clearly indicate that terrorism is much less 
“distant”—both in a physical and psychological sense—and much more 
constant in Israel than in the United States or the United Kingdom.61  
Thus, although the threat from terrorism is as unpredictable—at least in 
terms of the times and places of future terrorist attacks—and equally as 
devastating in Israel as in the United States or the United Kingdom, it is 
much more a present day-to-day reality in Israel than in the other two 
countries.  In addition, for the most part, Palestinian terrorism since 
2000 has mainly consisted of suicide bombings,62 hence fomenting 
 
reprehensible regardless of their causes, motives or objectives.  See Danny Rubinstein, The Price 
of Winning Equation, HAARETZ.COM., June 28, 2004, http://www.haaretz.com. 
 59 President Bush has repeatedly asserted that Al Qaeda terrorists seek to attack the United 
States because “[t]hey hate our freedoms.”  See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S9553, S9554 (2001) 
(address of President George W. Bush).  But even if they hate America’s freedoms, why would 
they travel half way around the world and commit suicide in order to disrupt its way of life?  One 
plausible answer is that they are zealots fulfilling their religious duties pursuant to the order of 
their fundamentalist leaders.  But even if that is the right answer, it is hardly comprehensible to 
most Americans whether religious or secular.  It bears emphasizing, however, that the fact that, 
from an American standpoint, Al Qaeda terrorism has no rational basis or purpose and that it is 
fueled by fanatical hatred does not mean that it lacks justification from the subjective standpoint 
of many of those who share the terrorists’ religious ideology.  Indeed, the latter do not merely 
regard American culture and mores as an abominable way of life in a far away place, but also as a 
grave threat to their own societies’ way of life.  In this vision, the global spread of American 
economic power, ideology and culture poses a grave threat against Islam.  Moreover, many in the 
Islamic world who reject terror as a legitimate means to combat the spread of American influence 
nevertheless agree that such influence poses a threat to their way of life.  See, e.g., Husain 
Haqqani, In the Bylanes of the War on Terror, INDIAN EXPRESS, July 12, 2003, 
http://www.indianexpress.com/archive_frame.php. 
 60 The difference in context between a concretely grounded local conflict and a generalized 
fleeting global one clearly seems to be the most relevant one in terms of the court decisions that 
are the principal focus of the present analysis.  Nevertheless, this is not to deny that at some 
deeper level there may be a greater convergence between the two respective contexts.  Indeed, the 
Palestinian circumstances giving rise to suicide bombers may be regarded as part of the 
intensifying Kulturkampf between militant Islam and the West.  In this connection, were the 
scenes of public rejoicing among certain Palestinian crowds immediately after the September 
11th attacks prompted by a perception of the United States as Israel’s principal ally and 
supporter?  Or were the attacks also perceived as a proud moment in the struggle between militant 
Islam and the West?  See Ronni Gordon Stillman, Arafat’s Press: What the Palestinian Authority 
Gets Away With, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 20, 2001, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ 
comment-stillman092001.shtml (describing Palestinians celebrating in streets upon hearing about 
the 9/11 attacks); World Shock Over U.S. Attacks, CNN.COM, Sept. 11, 2001, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/09/11/trade.centre.reaction/ (reporting Islamic Jihad 
stating that the 9/11 attacks were “a consequence of American policies in this region”). 
 61 For the United Kingdom, this is true with respect to terrorist threats posed by Al Qaeda, but 
not with respect to those posed by domestic terrorists, such as those associated with the struggle 
in Northern Ireland.  For present purposes, however, the focus will remain on the former. 
 62 There have also been cases where other methods were used, such as the explosion at the 
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predictability concerning the means of terror without thereby affecting 
that terror’s lethal nature or the randomness of its time and place.  In 
contrast, as of this writing, there has not been any terrorist attack in the 
United States since September 11, 2001, though threats and plots may 
abound.63  Moreover, as vividly illustrated by the terrorist attacks on 
commuter trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004,64 and on London 
subway trains and buses in July 2005, future terrorist attacks in the 
United States or the United Kingdom may take a vast array of different 
forms causing death and destruction of varying orders of magnitude.  
Such attacks may be on railroads, seaports, bridges, shopping centers, or 
chemical or nuclear plants, and they may involve ordinary explosives, 
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons.65  Consistent with this 
ongoing threat, in its current status, the American or British war on 
terror seems to have to entrust more to the imagination than its Israeli 
counterpart.  That is not to say that the American or British war is 
imaginary, but rather that imagination may blow the threats out of 
proportion while, at the same time, failures in imagination may leave 
the country inadequately prepared for future attacks that could prove 
particularly lethal. 
The difference concerning the greater role for imagination in the 
American and British contexts has implications for all branches of 
government, including the judicial branch, as it seems particularly 
important in relation to judicial balancing.  Indeed, any balancing 
between security and rights would seem more reliable in a situation in 
which threats to security tend to be constant and foreseeable than in a 
situation in which such threats are both speculative and subject to great 
variations.66 
 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which was set by a bomb left in a cafeteria.  See Jerusalem Blast 
Kills 7; 4 Americans Among Dead, CNN.com, Aug. 1, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2002/WORLD/meast/07/31/mideast/. 
 63 See e.g., David Johnston & Eric Lichtblau, Tourist Copters in New York City a Terror 
Target, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2004, at A1. 
 64 See Keith B. Richburg & Fred Barbash, Madrid Bombings Kill at Least 190: Al Qaeda-
Linked Group Claims Responsibility, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 11, 2004, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48577-2004/Mar11?language=printer. 
 65 See Karen Roebuck, Are We Safe?, PITTSBURGHLIVE.COM, Sept. 11, 2003 
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/search/s_154178.html (stressing the vulnerability of a stadium, 
railroads, bridges, shopping malls, etc.); Brian Ross, Portable Terror: Suitcase Nukes Raise 
Concern, ABCNEWS.COM, Nov. 8, 2001, http://archive.org (type 
“http:abcnews.go.com/sections/primetime/2020/ross011108.html” into Way Back Machine and 
click “Take Me Back”) (quoting President Bush’s concern that Bin Laden is seeking nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons). 
 66 See Cass R. Sunstein, Fear and Liberty, 71 SOC. RES. 967, 968 (2004) (arguing that fear 
exacerbated by uncertainly may so skew perceptions of dangers as to undermine reliability of 
judicial balancing). 
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As already noted, the Israeli cases arose in a very different setting 
than their American or British counterparts.67  The Israeli cases concern 
ongoing military operations and involve requests to the courts to 
intervene in order to change the course of such operations in significant 
ways.  In one case, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered that the location 
of the separation barrier between Israel and the West Bank being 
constructed by the military be moved in some places to reduce the 
losses, inconveniences and disruptions that its erection had caused to 
Palestinians who owned land, lived, or worked nearby.68  In the other 
case discussed below, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered some changes 
in the conduct of an ongoing military operation in Gaza.69  Although the 
Israeli Court made bold use of proportionality analysis in these cases, 
ongoing military operations seem inherently ill-suited for judicial 
intervention, let alone for subjection to judicial balancing.  This is both 
because of their very nature, which makes them heavily dependent on 
military expertise and the ability to take prompt and decisive action 
under constantly changing circumstances, and because of the inherently 
political nature—and in many cases, including the operations at stake in 
the Israeli cases, highly politically controversial nature—of military 
policy.70 
To subject purely military policy to judicial review seems 
inappropriate unless it can be plausibly attacked as contrary to law.  But 
even in the latter case, there would seem to be little room for judicial 
balancing.71  Moreover, when judicial balancing zeroes in on the 
 
 67 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
 68 See Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 9.  In a subsequent case relating to another segment of 
the separation barrier, Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court 
ordered the IDF to determine whether a suggested alternative location for the barrier less 
injurious to Palestinian civilians would be a plausible option from the standpoint of protecting 
Israeli security.  HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel [2005] [hereinafter 
Mara’abe].  See id. at paras. 114, 116. 
 69 See Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 1, paras. 4, 39. 
 70 The Palestinian plaintiffs in the case relating to construction of the separation barrier 
alleged that the latter was illegal as a means for Israel to unilaterally draw permanent boundaries 
thereby definitely annexing significant portions of the West Bank.  The Israeli Supreme Court 
rejected this claim and held the construction of the barrier to be for security reasons.  See Beit 
Sourik, supra note 1, paras. 28–30; see also Mara’abe, supra note 68, para. 98 (same conclusion 
notwithstanding International Court of Justice decision discussed infra note 71). 
 71 For example, in its advisory opinion on the separation barrier rendered on July 9, 2004, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded, inter alia, that construction of portions of the 
barrier in occupied territory was in violation of international law.  In reaching this conclusion the 
Court reviewed the relevant facts to determine whether they were consistent with the 
requirements imposed by applicable customary and treaty-based norms of international law.  See 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (Jul. 9).  The Israeli Supreme Court reviewed this advisory 
opinion in its Mara’abe decision and concluded that the two courts agreed on the applicable legal 
standards but not on the facts.  According to the Israeli Court, the ICJ did not have the full facts 
before it and did not engage in any proportionality analysis.  See Mara’abe, supra note 68, at 
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conduct of military affairs itself, such as the determination of whether 
large gatherings of Palestinian civilians should be permitted in the 
context of Israeli antiterrorist military operations in Gaza,72 courts seem 
to lack expertise to weigh different military options.  Finally, even if 
courts had such expertise, the constantly moving and changing nature of 
ongoing military action would appear to be sufficient by itself to 
underscore the unsuitable nature of judicial intervention under such 
circumstances.73 
Because of the Israeli Court’s bold use of proportionality analysis 
under circumstances so seemingly inappropriate for judicial balancing, 
close examination of its decisions seems particularly promising for 
purposes of elucidating the potential and pitfalls of judicial balancing in 
the context of the war on terror.  If such balancing proves in the end 
defensible, then proportionality analysis may have much greater value 
in the context of the war on terror than conventional wisdom suggests.  
If not, then the Israeli cases are likely to provide vivid illustration of the 
pitfalls of the balancing approach in connection with the war on terror. 
The American cases stand in sharp contrast to their Israeli 
counterparts with respect to judicial balancing.  Not only, as will be 
discussed below,74 because the American Court’s use of balancing 
seems as narrow as the Israeli Court’s seems broad, but also because the 
circumstances of the American cases seem as appropriate for balancing 
as those of the Israeli cases seem inappropriate.  Indeed, in the three 
American cases, individuals long held in detention by the U.S. military 
far from any theater of war were seeking a fair hearing to challenge the 
validity of their confinement, thus pursuing vindication of basic due 
process rights.75  Moreover, once the Court decided that the detainees 
were entitled to due process,76 the judicial task became to determine 
what process was due under the circumstances—a task that may require 
judicial balancing to establish the appropriate level of protection in the 
case at hand.  As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Mathews v. 
Eldridge,77 a case it relied upon in its decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,78 
 
para. 37-74. 
 72 See Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 1, paras. 24-30. 
 73 See discussion of Physicians for Human Rights infra Part III. 
 74 See infra Part II. 
 75 Besides asserting due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, the detainees advanced 
other claims, such as their right to habeas corpus and certain rights under international law.  
Whereas some of these latter claims may not be amenable to a balancing approach, resolution of 
the due process claims was determinative for the disposition of the cases.  For an extended 
discussion of this point, see infra Part II. 
 76 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 
(2004). 
 77 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 78 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
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the process due in a particular instance is to be determined by weighing 
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action” against 
the asserted Government interest “including the function involved” and 
the burdens the Government would need to bear were it to afford greater 
process.79  In short, judicial balancing is well established in procedural 
due process cases.  The reluctance with which the Court approached 
balancing in the three cases before it therefore raises the question of 
whether an otherwise routine judicial tool such as balancing becomes 
problematic or inappropriate in cases arising out of the war on terror. 
There is a parallel between the British case and the American 
cases, particularly that concerning the Guantanamo detainees.  The 
Guantanamo case involved an attempt to create a Constitution-free 
zone,80 whereas A(FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
concerned illegitimate deprivation of fundamental rights due to misuse 
of derogation powers.81  Indeed, Article 15 of the ECHR (incorporated 
into British domestic law through the Human Rights Act of 1998)82 
allows for derogation, in times of crisis and of emergency, from Article 
5—its basic individual liberty and security of the person provision that 
also guarantees due process rights—and from Article 14—its anti-
discrimination provision.83  British post-9/11 antiterrorist legislation, 
however, made for sweeping derogation, and the Attorney General took 
the position that it was for Parliament and the Executive, not the courts, 
to determine the nature of the threat to the country and the appropriate 
response to it.84  Had that view prevailed, and had the political branches 
determined that the threat posed by Al Qaeda created an emergency, 
then those deprived of their rights because of derogation would be, 
much like the Guantanamo detainees, left without basic rule of law 
protections.  This danger could only be remedied by judicial 
intervention.85 
The British case also involves issues of proportionality and 
balancing, particularly in relation to the determination of whether an 
emergency existed such as to justify derogation.  Accordingly, this case 
brings proportionality analysis and balancing directly to bear on the 
distinction between conditions of crisis, on the one hand, and ordinary 
conditions and conditions of stress, on the other.  This explicit treatment 
 
 79 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 80 See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. 
 81 A(FC) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).   
 82 See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 83 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 92-93. 
 84 See id. at 107. 
 85 Id. at 110-11. 
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of the three conditions is in contrast with the U.S. and Israeli cases, 
which only deal with them implicitly. 
Finally, brief mention must be made of the different legal regimes 
applicable, respectively, to the cases in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Israel.  The American cases involve claims arising under 
the U.S. Constitution, federal law, and international law.  Israel does not 
have a written constitution, and the Palestinians whose rights were at 
stake in the two cases involved live in occupied territory governed by 
laws of belligerent occupation.  Consequently, the Israeli cases arise 
under the law of belligerent occupation, Israeli administrative law, and 
international law.  In spite of these differences, in both Israel and the 
United States similarly conceived fundamental rights86 are in conflict 
with military policies and actions designed to promote the paramount 
security interests of the country.  For their part, the relevant legal norms 
applicable in the British case come from the ECHR, an international 
treaty, and from the Human Rights Act, a domestic statute.  
Nonetheless, functionally, these applicable norms involve basic liberty, 
equality, and due process rights.  From the standpoint of judicial 
balancing, therefore, the three legal regimes are sufficiently congruent 
to allow for fruitful comparison. 
 
II.     JUDICIAL BALANCING AND THE AMERICAN DECISIONS 
 
In only one of the three American decisions is judicial balancing 
explicitly used, and even in that case, only by a plurality of four 
justices.87  The other two decisions, though consistent with Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, do not rely on balancing as they concentrate on threshold 
issues.  In Rasul v. Bush, the Supreme Court’s focus was on whether the 
foreign alleged “enemy combatants” held in Guantanamo were entitled 
to the same rights to challenge their detention as those of their 
American counterparts held in the United States.88  Finally, although 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla raised the same substantive issues as Hamdi, the 
Court decided the case on procedural grounds.89 
 
 86 The humanitarian rights at stake in Israel are for present purposes functionally equivalent 
to American Due Process rights.  The main difference is that the American cases deal mainly with 
Procedural Due Process whereas the Israeli ones focus on rights that are roughly equivalent to 
American Substantive Due Process rights. 
 87 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004).  Justices Ginsburg and Souter, who 
concurred in part and dissented in part, can be said to have implicitly agreed to the plurality’s 
balancing, as their disagreement with the latter was over whether the Congress had given the 
Executive Branch authority to detain alleged “enemy combatants” indefinitely, and not over the 
right to challenge detentions actually authorized by Congress.  Id. at 540. 
 88 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
 89 Padilla had sued the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, for his allegedly 
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The Bush Administration came close to embracing executive 
unilateralism90 as its position in all three cases.91  The Court, however, 
squarely rejected that position by subjecting Hamdi’s claims to judicial 
balancing92 and acted consistent with that rejection in Rasul by refusing 
to accept the Government’s position that, when it came to foreign 
enemy combatant detainees, Guantanamo was beyond the reach of 
American courts.93  Moreover, executive unilateralism has been 
consistently rejected by the Supreme Court ever since the Civil War.94 
Unlike the executive unilateralist position, the process-based 
institutional approach involving judicial deference to the political 
branches where presidential action is backed by congressional 
authorization has been endorsed by the Court and appears to have been 
determinative in some cases.95  Judicial use of the process-based 
approach, however, has by no means been exclusive.  Often, as was the 
case in Hamdi’s plurality opinion, the process-based approach is 
combined with judicial balancing.  For the plurality in Hamdi, the 
finding that detention of alleged enemy combatants was authorized by 
Congress was but the first of two steps necessary to reach a proper 
decision.  This first step either leads to invalidation of the asserted 
Executive authority if Congress has not provided for it, or it leads to a 
necessary second step to determine through judicial balancing whether 
 
unconstitutional detention.  The Court held that the commander of the Navy brig where Padilla 
was being held was the proper party for such a lawsuit, and hence dismissed the case against 
Rumsfeld, without prejudice as to Padilla’s constitutional claims.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 
U.S. 426, 432 (2004). 
 90 See supra Introduction, p. 2088, for the three positions that have dominated the American 
debate, of which “executive unilateralism” is one. 
 91 This position was not pressed all the way, for although the Bush Administration argued that 
it was within the exclusive power of the President as Commander-in-Chief during a time of war 
to designate a person as an “enemy combatant” and to detain the latter until the end of hostilities 
(which in the case of the war against terror with potentially no certain end may mean 
permanently), it did concede that the courts had limited jurisdiction to determine whether a 
contested detention was within the authority of the Executive Branch, but not whether the 
decision of the Executive Branch was right or wrong based on disputed facts.  See Brief for 
Respondents at 26, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696).  Thus, the courts 
would be limited to an initial categorical inquiry.  For example, the courts could decide that it is 
not within the President’s war powers to designate as “enemy combatants” students on American 
campuses who criticize his war policies.  On the other hand, the Government assertion that 
Hamdi was initially detained in Afghanistan where the United States was engaged in a war 
against the Taliban would be all the information that a court would be entitled to before having to 
accept the President’s exclusive power to determine whether or not to label Hamdi an enemy 
combatant. 
 92 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
 93 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483. 
 94 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 
(1952); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
 95 Compare Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (holding trial of civilian by military commission 
without congressional authorization unconstitutional), with Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) 
(holding trial by military commission authorized by Congress constitutional). 
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the exercise of the congressionally backed authority unduly tramples on 
constitutionally protected liberties.96 
Because the American Constitution does not provide for special 
emergency powers, the need to balance security and rights is not 
suspended in wars and other emergencies.  In a country in which the 
constitution specifically provides for special emergency powers, such as 
France, the President may be entitled to his or her extraordinary powers 
without having to accommodate fundamental rights.97  It is not the 
same, however, when the U.S. President confronts a crisis, and even 
executive unilateralists do not claim that it is.  Indeed, what 
unilateralists argue is that the President is always obligated to uphold 
civil liberties, including in times of emergency, but that in time of war, 
because of his or her unique constitutional powers and responsibilities, 
it is for the President rather than the courts to strike the proper balance 
between security needs and fundamental liberties.98  Accordingly, the 
Bush Administration’s argument for minimal judicial intervention in 
connection with the enemy combatant detentions is not predicated on 
the proposition that the President could disregard constitutional liberties 
when fighting the war on terror.  Instead, the argument in question relies 
on a balancing approach, but insists that only the Executive is 
competent and constitutionally empowered to conduct such balancing. 
According to the Bush Administration, continued detention of 
Hamdi more than two years after his initial capture in Afghanistan was 
justified because it was a necessary means to achieving two compelling 
government interests: gathering crucial intelligence in the war on terror 
and preventing suspected terrorists in American custody from rejoining 
the armed struggle against the United States.99  Moreover, the balancing 
 
 96 As already mentioned supra note 87, Justices Ginsburg and Souter concluded that Hamdi’s 
detention was unconstitutional because in their view it was not authorized by Congress.  See 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 540.  The plurality, in contrast, found the detention congressionally 
authorized, but concluded that, even in the context of the war on terror, Hamdi was entitled to 
certain procedural rights that the Executive had theretofore refused to honor.  See id. at 509. 
 97 See French 1958 Constitution, art. 16; see also DORSEN ET AL., supra note 47, at 330 
(when exercising emergency powers, the French President can completely disregard fundamental 
rights; the only recourse against abuse of emergency powers is impeachment proceedings by the 
French Parliament.). 
 98 Cf. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (even in the case of war, the “United States 
Constitution . . . most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties 
are at stake”); see also Brief for Respondents at 43-44, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
(No. 03-6696) (describing Department of Defense intent to provide counsel to American enemy 
combatants and to allow them to challenge their detention once the military has determined that 
such challenge would not thwart intelligence gathering essential for national security). 
 99 The Bush Administration argued that it had virtually complete exclusive authority 
regarding enemy combatants because of the President’s Commander-in-Chief power.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  This might justify the inference that the Bush Administration’s claims 
of exclusivity are ultimately based on a categorical assertion rather that on implementation of a 
balancing approach were it not for the duty of the Executive Branch, even when acting 
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in question is similar to that employed by courts when they adjudicate 
other conflicts between government policy and fundamental rights 
claims.  Thus, for example, freedom of speech extends to all speech that 
does not inevitably hinder the realization of compelling government 
objectives.100  In other words, the Constitution accords great weight to 
the free and uninhibited exchange of ideas.  Nevertheless, government 
objectives can outweigh speech claims if they can satisfy a stringent 
strict scrutiny test. 
In sum, the processes of balancing called for in the context of the 
war on terror and in that of the garden-variety free speech case are 
essentially identical.  The only significant difference consistent with the 
Bush Administration’s position is that in one case balancing is for the 
Executive Branch while in the other it is for the courts.  Does that 
matter much?  Is the Executive as capable or as accountable as the 
Judiciary regarding such balancing?  Does it matter that most cases 
occur in ordinary times whereas the war on terror occurs under 
conditions of crisis or stress?  Finally, is the requisite balancing 
associated with the war on terror beyond the competence of courts? 
Before exploring how the three recent Supreme Court decisions 
may shed light on these questions, brief mention must be made of how 
the three different positions regarding how to reconcile security and 
liberty in times of emergency should be further understood in terms of 
the preceding observations. 
First, all three positions involve balancing, albeit differing in terms 
of who does the balancing and the kind of balancing involved.  The 
executive unilateralists want all balancing to be left to the President in 
his or her capacity as Commander-in-Chief.  On the other hand, civil-
libertarian maximalists want courts to do the balancing and want judges 
to give no greater deference to government claims of compelling 
security interests in times of emergency than to garden-variety 
government compelling-interest claims in areas such as healthcare or 
protection of the welfare of children.101  These two positions, therefore, 
differ not only with respect to who shall do the balancing, but also with 
 
unilaterally, to give fundamental liberties their due.  See supra note 98.  Although both the 
categorical interpretation and that reliance on balancing are plausible, given the Executive’s 
constitutional obligation regarding fundamental liberties, the latter interpretation clearly emerges 
as the better one. 
 100 In the familiar terminology of the courts, government cannot deny protection to any 
particular instance or kind of speech unless such denial meets the strict scrutiny test, i.e., such 
denial constitutes a necessary means to the realization of a compelling government interest.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
 101 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 15, at 297 (“[C]ivil libertarian 
idealists . . . deny . . . that shifts in the institutional frameworks and substantive rules of the 
liberty/security trade-offs do indeed regularly take place during times of serious security 
threats.”). 
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respect to the perspective from which such balancing shall be 
approached.  From the perspective of the President as Commander-in-
Chief, security is the primary concern and therefore may tend to be 
more heavily weighted even in the most scrupulous attempt to strike a 
fair balance between liberty and security.  From the perspective of the 
judge, on the other hand, the preoccupation with fair balancing would 
be paramount in the pursuit of striking a just and equitable equilibrium 
between the demands of liberty and the constraints called for by the 
need for security.  Furthermore, from a civil-libertarian maximalist 
perspective, the judicial branch has a special role in the protection of 
fundamental rights since the political branches are particularly attuned 
to majoritarian interests that may run counter to the protection of 
fundamental rights, particularly those of minorities.  Accordingly, from 
a civil libertarian maximalist perspective, judges should perform the 
requisite balancing, but they should place additional weight on 
fundamental liberties to offset tendencies by the other branches and by 
political majorities to overvalue security interests.102  And, in that view, 
judges should do so even in an emergency or in times of stress. 
The kind of balancing associated with the third position which 
relies on a process-based institutional approach differs from the 
balancing linked to the other two positions.  As already noted, the third 
position relies on institutional balancing, that is on “checks and 
balances” between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch 
rather than on direct actual balancing of security and liberty interests.103  
On a purely inter-institutional level, the kind of balancing that is 
associated with the process-based approach is exclusively indirect.  
Actually, the inter-institutional dynamic is more likely to result in a 
“check” than in a “balance.”  Indeed, because the President and 
Congress may be effectively answerable to somewhat different 
constituencies,104 and because they have different, and even at times 
antagonistic, institutional interests and priorities, they may each 
approach the conflict between security and liberty somewhat differently.  
In particular, because as Commander-in-Chief the President is prone to 
increasing his or her power in times of emergency, Congress has an 
institutional interest in acting in ways to keep presidential powers in 
check.  Furthermore, as each of the political branches has an internal 
constitutional duty to strike a proper balance between security and 
liberty, significant differences in how each branch strikes such balance 
 
 102 Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating that courts 
should review with more exacting scrutiny laws that may impinge on rights guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights or on the rights of unpopular minorities). 
 103 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 104 This could be due to differences between presidential politics and congressional politics, 
and to the different majorities on whose respective backing they may each depend. 
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may serve either as a check or as a balance.  As a check: when one 
branch disagrees with the other on how to draw the requisite balance, it 
can withhold its necessary cooperation for purposes of expanding 
governmental powers to deal with emergencies.  On the other hand, 
such disagreements can lead to further balancing as either branch can 
fine tune its balancing to reach a workable consensus. 
These three positions complement each other in that the respective 
strengths of each make up for the respective weaknesses of the others.  
Executive unilateralism is best equipped to meet security needs during 
an emergency, but prone to undervaluing liberty or to treating it in a 
rather perfunctory manner.  Ordinary judicial balancing is most 
transparent and best institutionally equipped to reconcile compelling 
government interests and fundamental liberties, but may be ill-equipped 
to properly assess threats to security or to cope with the complex and 
rapidly changing circumstances prevalent in emergencies or special 
circumstances such as those prompted by the war on terror.  Finally, 
process-based approaches lack the respective weaknesses of the other 
two approaches—unilateralism and lack of expertise regarding 
intelligence and security policy—but, by the same token, they fall short 
of the respective strengths of the other two approaches—concentrated 
and unitary decision-making in the face of dangerous and rapidly 
changing circumstances and systematic and consistent balancing of 
liberty and security.  In theory at least, the combination of a process-
based institutional approach with ordinary judicial balancing should 
afford the greatest protection to fundamental liberties, and conversely, 
executive unilateralism ought to be optimal to maximize security.105 
Of the three Supreme Court decisions, Hamdi affords the best 
opportunity to explore how balancing and the interplay between the 
positions and approaches examined above may fare in practice.  Indeed, 
the four opinions filed in the case,106 taken collectively, represent all 
these positions and approaches, and in addition, one of these opinions 
relies on a categorical approach rather than on judicial balancing,107 thus 
affording a glimpse into the contrast between these two approaches to 
judicial decision-making. 
 
 105 It is of course possible that, on occasion, shared responsibility among the President and 
Congress might prove best for security as the give and take between the two branches may lead to 
a more efficient security policy than would have been the case had the President acted alone. 
 106 Justice O’Connor announced the decision of the Court and wrote a plurality opinion joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.  Justice Souter, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, filed an opinion concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.  Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justice Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion.  Finally, Justice Thomas filed another dissenting 
opinion, which basically endorsed the Government’s position. 
 107 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
  
2108 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:5 
 
Yasser Hamdi, born in Louisiana, moved to Saudi Arabia as a child 
and was captured in 2001 in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance, a 
coalition of Afghan military groups opposed to the Taliban government, 
which subsequently turned him over to the United States military.108  
The latter detained and interrogated Hamdi in Afghanistan and then 
transported him to Guantanamo.109  In 2002, upon learning that Hamdi 
was a U.S. citizen, the military transferred him to the United States 
where he remained in indefinite military detention.110  The 
Government’s position was that Hamdi was an “enemy combatant” and 
that as such he could be held indefinitely without formal charges or a 
hearing until such time as the Government determined that access to 
counsel or further proceedings would be warranted.111 
Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging 
that his son was being illegally detained in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments112 and international law, including the Geneva 
Conventions on Prisoners of War.113  The petition asked the court to 
order the Government to cease interrogating Hamdi, to declare Hamdi’s 
detention unconstitutional, and to require that the Government either 
press charges against Hamdi and provide him with counsel or release 
him from detention.114  The petition also requested that the court order 
an evidentiary hearing to deal with the conflicting factual assertions of 
the parties concerning the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s capture 
and his transfer to the American military.115 
The facts were indeed disputed.  The Government asserted that 
Hamdi had received military training from the Taliban and that he 
became part of a Taliban unit with which he remained past September 
11, 2001, when the United States commenced armed conflict against the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.116  Hamdi was captured when his 
Taliban unit surrendered to the Northern Alliance forces and he 
thereafter “surrender[ed] his Kalashnikov assault rifle to [these 
forces].”117  Upon being turned over to the United States military, 
Hamdi was designated an “enemy combatant” because he was 
associated with the Taliban, which was—at the time of his surrender 
 
 108 Id. at 510. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 510-11. 
 112 Id. at 511. 
 113 Id. at 515.  Although some of the opinions in the case discussed the claims under 
international law, evaluation of these claims is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 114 Id. at 511. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 512-13. 
 117 Id. at 513. 
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and at the time of the Court’s decision—engaged in military conflict 
against the United States.118 
For his part, Hamdi’s father asserted that his son had traveled to 
Afghanistan to do “relief work,” that he had not been long enough in the 
country prior to September 11th to receive military training, and that as 
someone traveling alone for the first time he was “trapped” in that 
country once the military hostilities began.119 
Although the case raises a large number of issues, the plurality 
opinion by Justice O’Connor hones in on the factual dispute concerning 
the propriety of Hamdi’s designation as an enemy combatant after 
briefly dealing with two other issues.  The plurality opinion, however, 
provides the most comprehensive account of the appropriate role of 
judicial balancing in the context of the conflict between security and 
liberty in an ongoing war against terror. 
The two threshold issues dealt with briefly by the plurality opinion 
were the legal criteria for designation as an enemy combatant and 
whether the President acting alone has authority to detain enemy 
combatants indefinitely or whether congressional authorization was also 
required.  Concerning the first of these issues, the plurality 
acknowledged that large, difficult, and, to a significant extent, 
unprecedented questions were raised regarding the handling of enemy 
combatants in the novel, frequently unconventional, and potentially 
interminable war against terror.120  Nevertheless, by focusing on 
Hamdi’s circumstances narrowly, the plurality managed to avoid the 
most vexing questions.  Furthermore, concerning the second issue, the 
plurality, contrary to Justices Souter and Ginsburg, found that Congress 
had authorized the President’s order to detain enemy combatants such 
as Hamdi, thus obviating the need to broach the separation of powers 
question.121 
Whereas the Government had not publicly revealed the exact set of 
criteria it uses to classify someone as an enemy combatant,122 Hamdi 
fell within established criteria under national and international law.  
According to these criteria the Government can capture and detain an 
individual who is “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United 
States or coalition partners” that are “engaged in an armed conflict 
against the United States.”123  The detention of such an individual is to 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 511-12. 
 120 Id. at 519-21. 
 121 As will be discussed infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text, Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg concluded both that congressional authorization was required and that in cases such as 
Hamdi’s it was not granted. 
 122 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. 
 123 Id. 
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be for security purposes, not for punishment, to prevent him or her from 
rejoining the enemy’s forces after being released.  Such detention, 
moreover, cannot last beyond the end of hostilities.  Finally, relying on 
the precedent set in Ex parte Quirin,124 the plurality held that American 
citizenship is no bar to being designated an enemy combatant.125  The 
plurality went on to acknowledge, however, that dealing with enemy 
combatant designations in the war on terror would raise thorny 
problems as the enemy may not be visible or clearly defined and as the 
end of such war may be elusive and unlikely to be marked by a clear cut 
event, such as a formal cease-fire agreement.126  Nevertheless, these 
difficulties did not affect Hamdi’s case, as conventional military 
hostilities were taking place in late 2001 in Afghanistan when Hamdi 
was captured, and as such armed conflict between the United States and 
the Taliban was still occurring in Afghanistan in 2004 at the time the 
case was heard by the Court.127 
The bulk of the plurality’s analysis was devoted to Hamdi’s 
challenge to his designation as an enemy combatant.  The only evidence 
the Government introduced in the courts in support of its contention that 
Hamdi was properly being detained as an enemy combatant was the 
declaration of Michael Mobbs (the Mobbs Declaration), an officer of 
the Defense Department who had reviewed relevant documentation and 
was familiar with military policy and procedure relating to designation 
as an enemy combatant, but who had no firsthand information 
concerning Hamdi’s capture by the Northern Alliance, his being turned 
over to the United States military, or the evidence the military had 
considered in concluding that Hamdi was an enemy combatant.128 
The Government’s position before the Court was that the Mobbs 
Declaration was all the evidence that Hamdi was entitled to; for, as 
noted above,129 the Government insisted that the courts were limited to 
the determination of whether Hamdi’s detention was within the 
authority of the Executive Branch.  For that purpose, the Government 
argued it was sufficient that it present “some evidence,” and the Mobbs 
Declaration satisfied that requirement.130  Consistent with this argument, 
 
 124 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 125 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519. 
 126 Id. at 520. 
 127 Id. at 521.  Contrast the circumstances surrounding the detention of another American 
citizen, Jose Padilla, upon his arrival in a commercial airplane in Chicago from a trip to Pakistan.  
See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 524 U.S. 426, 426 (2004).  Determining whether Padilla was properly 
designated as an “enemy combatant” would have necessitated dealing with the difficult questions 
left open in Hamdi.  By disposing of the case on procedural grounds, the Court avoided dealing 
with these questions.  See id. at 426. 
 128 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-13. 
 129 See supra note 91. 
 130 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526. 
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the courts would have been limited to determining from the face of the 
Mobbs Declaration whether Hamdi’s detention was consistent with the 
Executive Branch’s authority to detain enemy combatants.  This 
determination, however, would have to have been made without regard 
to the veracity of the Mobbs Declaration or to the weight of the 
evidence on which it purported to rely.  Accordingly, the judiciary 
would have been limited to a determination, based solely on a 
declaration made by the Government, of whether the asserted 
Government authority falls within the legitimate realm of authority of 
the Executive Branch.  Under these circumstances, virtually complete 
executive unilateralism would prevail. 
Hamdi, on the other hand, wanted a full judicial hearing in 
compliance with constitutional safeguards and the law of evidence to 
determine whether he was properly designated as an enemy 
combatant.131  Had Hamdi been charged with a criminal offense, he 
would have been entitled to the full panoply of constitutional 
protections afforded criminal defendants and to the Government’s 
having to prove the charges against him beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Hamdi, however, though facing possible lifetime detention because of 
the conceivably unending nature of the war on terror, was being 
detained not as a criminal, but for interrogation and security purposes.  
As the Court’s plurality emphasized, Congress contemplated that habeas 
corpus petitioners would have an opportunity to present facts and rebut 
facts introduced against them.132  Moreover, the plurality specified that 
it was up to the courts to adjust the ways in which the due process 
requirements associated with habeas petitions may be handled 
depending on the particular context of the challenged detention.133 
Rejecting executive unilateralism and a purely process-based 
approach,134 the plurality declared that resolution of the conflict over 
what process was due to Hamdi had to be achieved on the basis of 
“constitutional balancing.”135  What had to be balanced, moreover, was 
Hamdi’s procedural due process right not to be deprived of his liberty 
without notice and an opportunity to be heard, on the one hand, and the 
Government’s compelling interest in waging the war in Afghanistan in 
the most efficient way possible with the least possible danger to U.S. 
troops and (because the war in Afghanistan is part of the war on terror 
 
 131 Id. at 524-25. 
 132 Id. at 526. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Rejection of a purely institutional process-based approach stems from the plurality’s 
refusal to accept the Government’s position, although the plurality concluded that detention of 
enemy combatants in connection with the war in Afghanistan had been authorized by the 
Congress.  See id. at 516-17. 
 135 Id. at 532. 
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and the Taliban is linked to Al Qaeda) to U.S. civilians at home and 
abroad, on the other hand. 
Such constitutional balancing is quite customary in judicial 
determinations of the limits of substantive constitutional rights, but 
quite problematic when used to specify procedural rights in cases such 
as Hamdi’s.  For example, free-speech rights do not extend to utterances 
that incite to violence.136  This means that the state’s interest in 
protecting those who are likely to become victims of violence as a 
consequence of inflammatory utterances that urge aggression against 
them clearly outweighs whatever communicative benefit may flow from 
the inciting utterance.  Accordingly, the balancing involved sets the 
limits of the substantive rights at stake.  In contrast, in at least certain 
settings, such as criminal prosecutions of serious crimes that may result 
in long prison terms, the confines of the applicable procedural rights 
cannot fluctuate depending on the circumstances of the crime at stake.  
For example, the criminal trial of a person accused of being a serial 
killer cannot be conducted with fewer procedural safeguards than the 
trial of someone accused of a white collar crime who poses no danger of 
violence whatsoever.  The Constitution guarantees the same procedural 
rights to all accused of having committed a serious crime; this is 
appropriate because they all have an equal stake in determination of 
innocence or guilt.  The presumed serial killer has the same interest as 
the presumed white collar criminal in being allowed to use the full 
panoply of available procedural safeguards in connection with the 
determination of his or her guilt. 
Hamdi was neither accused of a crime nor subjected to a criminal 
proceeding, but his detention, which the plurality acknowledged could 
potentially have lasted throughout his entire lifetime,137 was comparable 
to that of a convicted criminal’s sentenced to a long prison term.  The 
determinative issue in Hamdi is not whether the security interests of the 
United States far outweigh the liberty interests of enemy combatants, 
but whether or not Hamdi was an enemy combatant.  And, with respect 
to this latter issue, while there may be no need to adhere to the 
formalities of a criminal trial, it is difficult to understand why Hamdi 
should not have been entitled to procedural safeguards that are as 
efficacious and as fair as those afforded criminal defendants. 
Balancing in the context of procedural due process rights is 
certainly warranted in many civil cases in which the threatened 
deprivation of liberty or property is relatively minor.  Whereas 
temporary suspension of a state granted license or denial of a state 
permit resulting in a loss of business must comply with the due process 
 
 136 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969). 
 137 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520. 
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requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard, it is clear that 
insisting on the formalities of a criminal trial in such cases would be 
completely disproportionate.138 
To determine what process is due to comply with due process 
under given circumstances, the courts resort to judicial balancing 
consistent with the criteria set in Mathews v. Eldridge,139 a case 
involving termination of disability benefits.  The test articulated in 
Mathews and implemented by the plurality in Hamdi requires weighing 
the private interest affected by state action against the Government’s 
asserted interest, taking into proper account the added burden the 
Government would have to assume were it to afford greater process.140  
More specifically, what the judicial balancing test must address is “the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the private interest affected if the 
process were reduced against the “probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute safeguards.”141 
The plurality recognized that Hamdi’s interest in being free from 
physical detention by the Government is “the most elemental of liberty 
interests”142 and that the danger of erroneous deprivation of liberty in 
the absence of sufficient process is very high.143  In particular, the 
plurality noted that the danger of mistaken military detention of 
journalists and humanitarian relief workers in a war such as that fought 
in Afghanistan is quite high.144  On the other hand, the military’s need 
to detain captured enemy combatants to prevent their return to the 
theater of war to fight alongside the enemy is compelling, as is the 
freedom to pursue strategic military objectives with utmost 
flexibility.145  Equally paramount is that the military not get bogged 
down with trial-like processes that would distract them from their 
military mission and might compromise military secrets by making 
them subject to discovery.146 
Under these circumstances, the plurality found that neither the 
criminal-trial-like process proposed by Hamdi nor the Mobbs 
Declaration offered by the government struck the proper balance.147  
 
 138 Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (holding that tenured 
public employee facing dismissal was entitled to a pre-termination notice, oral or written, of 
charges, an explanation of employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the 
story). 
 139 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 140 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
 141 Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 530 (citing Brief for AmeriCares et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner). 
 145 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531. 
 146 Id. at 531-32. 
 147 Id. at 532-33. 
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The former would be too burdensome on the military; the latter would 
not allow a meaningful challenge to an erroneous detention. 
The proper balance, according to the plurality, required that a 
citizen detained as an enemy combatant be given notice of the factual 
basis for such detention and be entitled to rebut the Government’s 
factual assertion before a neutral decision-maker.148  To alleviate the 
burden on the Government while the Executive is engaged in active 
military operations, the plurality specified that hearsay evidence is 
acceptable, and that once the Government made out a prima facie case 
for detention, it would be appropriate to grant the Government’s 
evidence a presumption of validity:149 the burden of persuasion would 
then shift to the detainee to rebut that presumption and to demonstrate 
that he or she does not fall within the relevant criteria.150  This burden 
shifting procedure would ensure, in the plurality’s estimation, that “the 
errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to 
prove military error.”151 
The “balance” struck by the plurality imposes little additional 
burden on the Government, and it may be adequate for an erroneously 
detained journalist, but not for someone in a predicament such as 
Hamdi’s.  The Government’s initial burden would be satisfied by a 
Mobbs Declaration, but the shifting of the burden of proof would make 
it very difficult and burdensome to overcome the Mobbs Declaration’s 
presumption of validity.  It is well known that the determination of 
which party bears the burden of proof is often decisive in litigation.152  
In the case of a journalist, bearing the burden of proof may not amount 
to an insurmountable obstacle if the detainee is employed by a large 
news organization that can vouch for the journalist’s employment and 
for his or her assignment to cover the war.  But what if someone like 
Hamdi had been turned over to the Northern Alliance by local Afghan 
villagers who acted to receive a ransom?  It would presumably be 
impossible to meet the burden of proof, and the detainee’s fate would be 
sealed as a practical matter by the Mobbs Declaration. 
As bad as the plurality balancing was for Hamdi, it is even worse 
for someone like Jose Padilla, a United States citizen arrested on 
American soil upon suspicion of involvement in a terrorist plot to carry 
out an attack within the United States with a nuclear weapon, a so-
called dirty bomb.153  Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan in a theater of 
 
 148 Id. at 533. 
 149 Id. at 533-34. 
 150 Id. at 534. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551 (1965). 
 153 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).  After continued detention without charges 
after the refiling of his case in the lower courts, in November 2005, the Justice Department 
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war, and though to be sure very difficult, it would not have necessarily 
been impossible for him to obtain the testimony of people he dealt with 
in Afghanistan that might have helped him meet his burden of proof 
were he in fact the relief worker that his father claimed.154  In a case 
such as Padilla’s, in contrast, the Government’s Mobbs Declaration may 
simply consist of a statement that a reliable undercover intelligence 
operation has gathered convincing evidence that the detainee is involved 
in an ongoing terrorist plot to plant a dirty bomb in some unknown 
location in the United States at some unknown time in the future.  The 
government could plausibly claim, moreover, that revealing the source 
of the information contained in the Mobbs Declaration would 
compromise national security and seriously derail the Executive’s 
conduct of the war on terror.  Under such circumstances, it would seem 
nearly impossible for Padilla, or for most other American citizens for 
that matter, to meet the requisite burden in order to overcome the 
presumption of validity accorded to the Government. 
In the last analysis, whereas the plurality rejected Executive 
unilateralism, when one considers where the balance was struck, the 
departure from unilateralism was limited.  Furthermore, from the 
standpoint of judicial balancing itself, the plurality accorded too little 
weight to the serious deprivation of liberty associated with the 
designation as an enemy combatant and too much weight to security 
concerns relating to the war on terrorism.  The plurality’s handling of 
balancing in Hamdi thus raises the question of whether it would be 
better to use a categorical approach in enemy combatant cases. 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hamdi does offer a 
categorical solution to the conflict between the government and Hamdi.  
According to Justice Scalia, the Government could only continue to 
detain Hamdi indefinitely without pressing charges against him if 
Congress were to suspend the right to habeas corpus, which it can only 
do in case of an invasion or rebellion.155  Otherwise, the Government 
could either press charges against Hamdi or release him, as the 
Constitution would then require that his habeas petition be granted.156  
 
indicted Padilla as a minor figure in a conspiracy to support radical Islamic fighters in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and elsewhere.  See Neil A. Lewis, Indictment Portrays Padilla 
As Minor Figure in a Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at A27.  He was since transferred from 
military custody to civilian custody and has pled not guilty to the charges.  See Terry Aguayo, 
Padilla Pleads Not Guilty; Bail is Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A14.  The government’s 
request to transfer custody was granted by the Supreme Court after the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit refused.  See Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S.Ct. 978 (2006). 
 154 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 155 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 562.  Congress would have to decide whether the September 11, 
2001 attacks constituted an “invasion” and whether these attacks still justified suspension several 
years later.  Id. at 578. 
 156 Id. at 576-78. 
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Justice Scalia further stressed that there were several criminal laws 
already enacted by Congress that the Executive could invoke to press 
charges against someone like Hamdi, including laws against treason, 
against providing material support to terrorists, and against “enlistment 
to serve in armed hostility against the United States.”157  Significantly, 
the only American citizen other than Hamdi detained after capture in the 
Afghan theater of war, John Lindh, had already been criminally charged 
and convicted.158 
Unlike Lindh, who fell into American hands and who pled guilty to 
criminal charges,159 Hamdi may well have been difficult to convict.  
Indeed, given that he was captured by the Northern Alliance, the 
Government may have felt that it lacked a sufficiently solid case to meet 
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.160 
Justice Scalia’s categorical approach could be even more 
problematic for the Government in cases such as Padilla’s.  Suppose, for 
example, that American undercover intelligence officials working with 
foreign counterparts had come upon solid evidence of a detainee’s 
participation in a conspiracy to plant a dirty bomb at a specified location 
within the United States.  Suppose further that the evidence in the 
Government’s possession would suffice to prove the detainee’s active 
involvement in the above conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
Government, however, may not be in a position to prosecute the 
detainee without compromising vital intelligence sources and methods.  
Under such circumstances, under the categorical approach, the 
Government would seem to have little choice but to release the detainee 
after a relatively brief period of detention. 
Some of the difficulties noted above with respect to the balancing 
approach or the categorical approach may be better met by the process-
based institutional approach.  As already mentioned, the plurality 
opinion in Hamdi placed some reliance on the process-based 
approach,161 though that reliance was rather perfunctory.  The opinion 
of Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, however, 
makes much more vigorous use of the process-based approach.  
Drawing on the Constitution’s reliance on “checks and balances,” and 
referring to the permanent tension between security and liberty, Justice 
Souter stressed that in time of war, Congress is in a better position than 
the Executive to strike the right balance.  In his view, the task of 
 
 157 Id. at 561. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Significantly, a few months after the Supreme Court decision, Yasser Hamdi was released 
and sent back to Saudi Arabia.  See ‘Enemy Combatant’ Sees Freedom, CBSNEWS.COM, Oct. 11, 
2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/27/national/main645822.shtml. 
 161 See supra notes 134-135 and accompanying text. 
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balancing is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, 
whose responsibility is to maintain security.  For reasons of inescapable 
human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious 
threat is not the branch on which to rest the nation’s entire reliance in 
striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on 
the way to victory; the responsibility for security will naturally amplify 
the claim that security legitimately raises.162  In other words, because 
Congress is less likely to be biased in favor of security, it is better suited 
to strike the right balance and thus check any Executive propensity to 
disproportionately favor security.163 
The process-based approach envisioned by Justice Souter provides 
a preferable and presumably more reliable alternative to executive 
unilateralism and, at least in those cases in which statutory law falls on 
the side of liberty, to ad-hoc judicial balancing.164  On the other hand, 
the process-based approach lacks the flexibility of its two alternatives.  
Indeed, neither the broad post-9/11 congressional authorization nor the 
more restrictive Non-Detention Act was drafted with the peculiarities of 
the war in Afghanistan or the capture of individuals such as Hamdi and 
Padilla in mind.165 
Another important factor further complicates the task of striking a 
proper balance between security and liberty in cases such as Hamdi’s, 
Padilla’s, and those of the Guantanamo detainees.  That factor is that the 
war on terror is fought at once as a conventional military war and as a 
national and international operation designed to bring criminals to 
justice.166  Indeed, the military campaign conducted by the United States 
and its allies against the Taliban in Afghanistan was regarded by the 
Bush Administration as a war against a state army.167  At the same time, 
 
 162 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535-37. 
 163 Unlike the plurality, Justice Souter did not rely on the broadly phased congressional 
authorization allowing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks” to assess the legality of indefinite detention of enemy combatants.  See Hamdi, 
542 U.S. at 51 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2002))).  This authorization adopted shortly after the September 
11, 2001, attacks did not refer to detentions and thus, in Justice Souter’s view, it was neither 
consistent with, nor did it supersede, the Non-Detention Act, which provides that “[n]o citizen 
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of 
Congress.”  See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542. 
 164 As mentioned in the discussion of the plurality opinion, see supra notes 120-155 and 
accompanying text, where there is Congressional authorization for a detention, absent suspension 
of habeas corpus, such detention can still be challenged in the courts as being violative of the 
detainee’s constitutional rights. 
 165 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 166 See supra note 37. 
 167 See Bush: Geneva Treaty Applies to Taliban Detainees, CNN.COM, Feb. 7, 2002, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/02/07/ret.bush.detainees/.  Although President Bush specified 
that the Taliban had not been recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of 
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the President made clear that Al Qaeda members and other terrorists 
would not be treated as fighters and that he would not afford them rights 
under the Geneva Conventions.168  The problem caused by this 
bifurcated approach without clear lines of demarcation was that issues 
relating to those designated as enemy combatants did not fit neatly 
within either of the two well-defined distinct legal paradigms.  In cases 
of conventional war, captured enemy soldiers are to be subjected to the 
categorical prescriptions of the Geneva Conventions and of other 
relevant bodies of international law and detained until the end of 
hostilities in accordance with the requirements that these laws 
impose.169  In contrast, criminal suspects must be charged with a crime 
or released from detention within a relatively short time.170  Also, if 
charged they must be afforded the full set of constitutionally guaranteed 
procedural protections regardless of the crime involved.171 
In all three cases, the government attempted to straddle the line 
between these two regimes in order not to fall within the strictures of 
the criminal law system while also escaping from the requirements of 
the Geneva Conventions.  Neither the American citizens, Hamdi and 
Padilla, nor those Guantanamo detainee plaintiffs in Rasul—who were 
citizens of countries friendly to the United States, such as Australia and 
Kuwait172—fell within the ordinary definition of enemy combatants.  
Moreover, they all contested their designations as enemy combatants.  
The government sought to avoid legal responsibility for the detentions 
by seeking to carve out as best it could a no man’s land between the two 
regimes. 
Only the plurality in Hamdi sought to resolve this impasse by 
means of a balancing approach.  Four of the remaining five justices 
found Hamdi’s indefinite detention illegal.173  On the other hand, both 
Padilla and Rasul left the balancing question open.  In the end, both the 
need for balancing and the kind of balancing needed depend on which 
legal regime is properly brought to bear on these cases.  And, neither of 
the two familiar paradigms, that of criminal law or that of the law of 
war, seems adequate. 
 
Afghanistan, he declared that he would apply the Geneva Conventions to Taliban fighters. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 170 See Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hamdi.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-58 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 171 See supra note 37. 
 172 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470-71 (2004). 
 173 These were Justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.  See supra notes 155-164 and 
accompanying text.  Justice Thomas in his dissent agreed with the government’s position.  See 
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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III.     BALANCING, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE ISRAELI DECISIONS 
 
Not only is the Israeli Court’s balancing as broad as the American 
Court’s is narrow,174 but the Israeli cases are much more directly related 
to an ongoing war than their American counterparts.175  Whereas the 
American cases dealt with procedural rights of detainees far removed 
from theaters of war, the Israeli cases concerned substantive rights 
pressed by civilian non-combatants affected by ongoing military 
activity, including active combat within the very core of the relevant 
theater of war.176  Moreover, whereas in the United States balancing did 
not result in a dramatic departure from the Government’s position, in 
Israel, balancing led the Court to order the Government to make 
substantial changes to the location of the separation barrier built for 
security and to make changes in the conduct of an ongoing military 
operation in Gaza.177 
If, from the standpoint of security, the circumstances surrounding 
the Israeli cases seem much less amenable to balancing than their 
American counterparts, from the standpoint of the respective rights 
involved, the opposite appears to be true.  The Israeli cases involve 
substantive liberty, property, and dignity rights—which are usually 
subjected to judicial balancing.178  These rights are customarily not 
absolute, and their limits are usually established through judicial 
balancing or proportionality-based analysis.  As already mentioned, the 
relative weight ascribed to the particular rights and government interests 
involved may vary from context to context or among various 
jurisdictions, and so may the proportion by which a government interest 
must outweigh a right to justify limitation or derogation, but the 
determination always involves some kind of judicial balancing.179 
The Israeli cases relate to military action claimed to be necessary 
for the security of the country and for the safety of its citizens.  At the 
same time, these military undertakings adversely affected the legitimate 
and recognized liberty, property, and dignity interests of Palestinian 
civilians residing in the occupied territory areas affected.  In a 
constitutional democracy, the military has an obligation—enhanced in 
Israel by the legal responsibilities imposed by the international laws of 
 
 174 See supra, p. 2105. 
 175 See supra, p. 2106. 
 176 See Mara’abe, supra note 68 (separation fence erected to thwart would be suicide bombers 
coming from West Bank); Beit Sourik, supra note 1 (same); see also Physicians for Human 
Rights, supra note 1 (military operation, including hostile combat in Gaza). 
 177 See infra notes 190, 214, 217, 228-232 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra p. 2117. 
 179 See supra Part I.C. 
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belligerent occupation applicable to the West Bank and Gaza180—to 
take into account, and to ascribe proper weight, to the needs, legitimate 
interests, rights, and liberties of the civilians who will be inevitably 
adversely affected by implementation of military policy.181  Beyond 
that, however, should ongoing military operations be subjected to 
judicial balancing?  And if they are, are judges competent to perform 
the requisite balancing operations? 
The Israeli decisions rest on a seeming paradox.  As Chief Justice 
Barak starkly stated in Beit Sourik, “We, Justices of the Supreme Court 
are not experts in military affairs.”182  Yet, he also hastened to add that 
his Court is competent to review the Israeli military commander’s 
decision concerning the location of the barrier because judges are the 
experts in applying the principle of proportionality.183  This sense of 
paradox is heightened, moreover, by the Court’s refusal to enter into the 
battle among military experts.  The Palestinian plaintiffs whose land 
was seized, mobility curtailed, and communal life disrupted, were 
joined by the Council for Peace and Security (Council), an Israeli 
nongovernmental organization that included high ranking reserve 
officers of the IDF and that had expertise in military security.184  The 
Council joined the Palestinian plaintiffs as amici curiae185 and argued 
that in their expert opinion, better security for Israel and less intrusive 
incursion into Palestinian lands and community life could be achieved 
by moving the barrier closer to Israel.186  The defendant, the IDF’s 
military commander in the West Bank, acknowledged the expertise of 
the Council but disagreed with their judgment, insisting that the actual 
location for the barrier decided upon by the IDF was the optimal 
security option after giving proper weight to political considerations and 
to the legitimate interests of Palestinian civilians.187  Faced with this 
disagreement among experts, the Court recognized that the conflicting 
positions involved were “based upon contradictory military views,”188 
but went on to declare “we must grant special weight to the military 
opinion of the official who is responsible for security.”189  Yet, for all its 
 
 180 See Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 23. 
 181 Id. at para. 13 (discussing the military’s assertion than in planning the separation barrier 
“great weight was given” to the interests of Palestinians affected). 
 182 Id. at para. 46. 
 183 Id. at para. 48. 
 184 Id. at para. 16. 
 185 Id. at para. 18. 
 186 Id. at paras. 18-19. 
 187 Id. at para. 20. 
 188 Id. at para. 47. 
 189 Id.  While the court refused to weigh the respective strengths and weakness of the two 
contending military positions, it did indicate that the military commander’s position was not 
beyond challenge.  The commander was entitled to a presumption that his “professional reasons 
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unwillingness to enter the battle of the military experts, the Court 
engaged in a weighing of the tradeoffs between security and liberty 
struck by the barrier, and concluded that the IDF had acted in a 
disproportionate manner.190  Furthermore, based on that conclusion, the 
Court ordered the military commander to come up with changes 
regarding the barrier in order to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of proportionality.191 
The Court asserted that military affairs are no different than any of 
the other areas beyond its expertise in relation to which it is called upon 
to adjudicate controversies by means of judicial balancing.192  Close 
examination of what the Court does rather than what it says it does, 
however, leads to a much more nuanced conclusion.  Military affairs are 
in some respects like other specialized fields, but in other respects, they 
appear sui generis.  Before evaluating this conclusion in greater detail 
and assessing how it affects the legitimacy and efficacy of judicial 
balancing in cases dealing with military affairs, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at the Israeli Court’s handling of the cases before it. 
The Court’s recourse to balancing and proportionality analysis in 
its adjudication of the controversy over the separation barrier is 
grounded both in the relevant application of substantive law and in the 
Court’s established practice of using balancing to resolve conflicts 
between competing interests.  From the standpoint of substantive law, 
the international law of belligerent occupation allows the occupying 
country to protect its security and that of its citizens, but also requires 
that country to balance its security needs against the rights, needs, and 
interests of the population residing in the occupied territory.193  More 
generally, proportionality is a key principle of the law of war, which 
requires establishing a balance between “military needs and 
humanitarian considerations.”194  Proportionality is also a general 
principle of Israeli administrative law and has more recently become a 
constitutional principle incorporated in Article 8 of Israel’s Basic Law 
on human dignity and freedom.195 
As already mentioned, the IDF, which is an administrative body 
under Israeli law, had performed its substantive legal obligation to 
balance security concerns against the rights and interests of affected 
 
are sincere reasons.”  Id.  This presumption can only be overcome by “very convincing 
evidence.”  Id. 
 190 Id. at paras. 60-62. 
 191 Id. at para. 86. 
 192 Id. at para. 46. 
 193 Id. at para. 34. 
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Palestinians before settling on the location of the barrier.196  In this 
respect, the IDF’s administrative duty is equivalent to the constitutional 
duty of the U.S. Executive.197  Unlike the American Court however, the 
Israeli Court was engaging in administrative review and, accordingly, 
its first task was to determine whether the military commander had 
performed his balancing duty in good faith.  The Court found that he 
had.198 
The Court’s exercise in judicial balancing started after this initial 
determination, thus raising the question of the extent to which it merely 
supplements the non-judicial balancing performed by the military 
commander as opposed to engaging in a de novo balancing of its own.  
To elucidate this question, it is first necessary to inquire briefly into the 
proportionality test used by the Court. 
The proportionality test used by the Court, applicable under both 
international law and Israeli administrative law, is divided into three 
subtests.199  The first subtest requires that the administrative means used 
be rationally related to the realization of the state’s objective.200  The 
second subtest prescribes that the means used to realize the objective be 
those that are “least injurious” to adversely affected individuals.201  
Finally, the third subtest, that of “proportionality in the narrow sense,” 
requires that the harm to the relevant individuals be proportionate to the 
benefit to the state.202  The third subtest can be satisfied in one of two 
possible ways: either by directly weighing the benefits against the 
harms of the proposed administrative course of action; or, by comparing 
different administrative alternatives to one another to determine whether 
the decrease in benefit caused by shifting from the most beneficial 
alternative to a somewhat less beneficial one is accompanied by a 
greater decrease in harm.  If it is, then proportionality requires that the 
somewhat less beneficial but significantly less harmful alternative be 
adopted.203 
All three subtests require balancing, albeit different kinds of 
balancing.  The rationality requirement of the first subtest calls for 
minimal balancing in that only such means that are so disproportionate 
as to be irrational are excluded.204  The second subtest requires a 
 
 196 See supra note 181. 
 197 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 198 Beit Sourik, supra note 1, at para. 85. 
 199 Id. at para. 40. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Minimal “rationality” analysis does not, strictly speaking, always require balancing.  
Whether or not it does depends on whether the relevant means are “irrational” because grossly 
disproportionate, or “irrational” because illogical, contradictory, or inherently absurd.  For 
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balancing among the respective injuries that would result from adoption 
of the various possible means toward the relevant administrative 
objective.  This requires applying a proportionality standard that 
includes comparison and may involve “balancing” in a pure formal 
sense, as when one alternative calling for the expropriation of one 
hundred landowners is “weighed” against another alternative involving 
only fifty such expropriations.  On the other hand, more problematic 
balancing would become necessary if one alternative involved land 
expropriations and the other restrictions on the affected population’s 
freedom of movement.205  Finally, the third subtest, that of 
proportionality proper, requires extensive balancing, either between 
military benefits and civilian harms, or between the ratios of harm to 
benefit for various plausible alternatives. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s declarations to the contrary, the 
military dispute between the Council and the military commander 
concerning which of their proposed routes for the barrier would be best 
for security206 did figure prominently in the Court’s application of the 
three-part proportionality test.  The dispute centered on whether the 
barrier would make Israel more secure if built away from Israel’s 
population or if built away from the Palestinian population.  The 
Council maintained that a barrier close to Israel’s population would be 
more easily defended as it would provide time and space to intercept 
terrorists before they could harm Israeli soldiers or civilians.207 
The military commander’s view, on the other hand, was that a 
barrier closer to the Palestinian population would be safer for Israeli 
soldiers and would give the latter a better opportunity to run down or 
capture terrorists before they could reach Israeli civilians.208  
Furthermore, the military commander and the Council agreed that a 
 
example, increasing the speed limit on highways from 65 to 130 miles per hour for purposes of 
improving highway safety, when statistics undisputedly demonstrate that the number of deaths on 
the highway increase dramatically when cars travel at higher speeds, would be illogical and 
contradictory.  In contrast, prohibiting driving by all persons under twenty-five because of 
evidence that those in that age group cause twice as many fatal automobile accidents as older 
drivers—though ninety percent of those under twenty-five drive as safely as their older 
counterparts—would not be illogical, as it would lead to an increase in safety on the highways.  
Nevertheless, such a total ban would be so disproportionate as to be “irrational.” 
 205 In the Mara’abe case, the Court held that the segment of the separation fence in dispute 
violated the second subtest because of the Israeli government’s failure to consider a prima facie 
plausibly less injurious alternative route for reasons of political expediency.  See Mara’abe, supra 
note 68, paras. 113-14.  The actual segment of the separation fence encompassed certain 
Palestinian villages, placing them on the Israeli side of the barrier and cutting them off from the 
West Bank.  The plausible alternative location for the fence would leave the affected village on 
the Palestinian side but was opposed by an Israeli community that feared an adverse effect on its 
quality of life. 
 206 See supra notes 184-191 and accompanying text. 
 207 Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 18. 
 208 Id. at para. 20. 
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barrier closer to the Palestinian population would be more injurious to 
that population than one right next to the Israeli population,209 and also, 
according to the Council, a closer barrier would further embitter the 
Palestinians and thus eventually foment greater terrorism.210 
The dispute between military experts had a significant bearing on 
the Court’s application of the third subtest under the proportionality 
standard.  The Court resorted to the second alternative, namely, 
comparing different plans for the location of the barrier with respect to 
the ratio of harm to benefit that each of these plans would produce.  
Accordingly, the Court did not engage in a direct weighing of harms 
and benefits of the IDF plan, but it did take into account the plan 
proposed by the Council for purposes of weighing the IDF plan against 
plausible alternatives.211  This comparison between the two plans, 
moreover, appears to contradict the Court’s assertion that it would 
refuse to opine on the relative merits of various military options. 
The Court sought to avoid this contradiction by arguing that the 
comparison carried out in the course of conducting the third subtest was 
not meant to be a comparison of military options.  Instead, it was a 
comparison necessitated by the Court’s duty to balance the IDF’s plan 
regarding the barrier against plans with different ratios of harms to 
benefits.  As the Court saw it, it was not comparing military options to 
determine which one was militarily best, but to determine whether the 
IDF plan was on balance compatible with the humanitarian 
considerations owed Palestinian civilians under Israeli and international 
law.212  In other words, the military comparison was not for its own 
sake, but merely subordinate to finding the proper balance between 
security and liberty. 
The specific finding of the Court was that even though it accepted 
that the IDF plan led to greater security than the Council’s, the IDF plan 
also led to much greater injury than the Council’s.  Therefore, 
concluded the Court, since the difference in security between the plans 
was “minute,” the IDF plan failed the third subtest and had to be 
rejected as disproportionate.213  Based on that conclusion, the Court 
ordered the military commander to draw a new plan for the barrier, and 
 
 209 Id. at paras. 18, 29. 
 210 Id. at para. 18. 
 211 Id. at para. 61. 
 212 Id. at para. 48. 
 213 Id. at para. 61.  Cf. Mara’abe, supra note 68, para. 116.  If the plausible alternative 
mentioned supra note 205 does not prove viable, then without the disputed segment “there is no 
security for the Israelis,” and with it “there is a severe injury to the fabric of life of the residents 
of the [Palestinian] villages.”  Applying subtest three under such circumstances will be “the most 
difficult of the questions.”  Id. 
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specified that one possible, though by no means required, alternative 
was adoption of the Council’s plan.214 
In the end, the Court did not engage in a direct comparison of 
military plans, but it did perform an indirect comparison.  The Court did 
not order the military commander to adopt the Council’s plan, but it did 
order him to adopt something comparable.  Finally, the Court struck 
down the IDF’s plan not because it did not strike a proper military 
balance between security and liberty, but because it failed to strike that 
very same balance as required by humanitarian considerations. 
From a substantive point of view, the balancing engaged in by the 
Court in Beit Sourik is certainly de novo balancing rather than a review 
of the adequacy of an administrative agency’s balancing.  The Israeli 
Court’s balancing seems to be the equivalent of the kind of balancing 
that courts routinely perform in ordinary civilian settings.215  This 
squarely raises the question of whether different criteria concerning 
balancing should apply in the context of military affairs than in that of 
civilian ones.  This question will be examined in Part V below, but brief 
reference must be made here to the Physicians for Human Rights 
decision, in which the Israeli Court went even further than it did in Beit 
Sourik, and in its own words, was “at the outer limits of the reach of the 
judiciary”216 when it used judicial balancing with respect to military 
actions that included ongoing armed combat with the enemy.217 
Physicians for Human Rights arose out of an Israeli military 
operation in the area of Rafah in the Gaza strip.218  The IDF mission 
was to locate underground tunnels believed to be used to smuggle 
weapons from Egypt and to arrest persons wanted for terrorist 
activity.219  The IDF engaged in armed combat, exchanged gunfire and 
was targeted with explosive charges during the course of the 
operation.220 
 
 214 Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 71. 
 215 One area in which courts are routinely called upon to balance conflicting claims is the 
Dormant Commerce Clause under the American Constitution.  The relevant principle, under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, is that where Congress has not regulated an area of interstate 
commerce, state regulation that is not discriminatory against out of state business is constitutional 
so long as the benefits it produces outweigh the burdens that the regulation in question imposes 
on interstate commerce.  See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).  Thus, for 
example, courts are called upon to determine whether the benefits produced by particular safety, 
health or environmental regulations outweigh the burdens they impose on the free flow of 
interstate commerce.  See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.761 (1945) (weighing safety of 
shorter trains versus extra costs of uncoupling and reconstituting long trains at state borders). 
 216 Physicians for Human Rights, supra note 1, para. 9. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. at para. 1. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. 
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The lawsuit was brought by human rights organizations prompted 
by the harm caused to Palestinian civilians in Rafah by the military 
operations, including demolition of houses and civilian injuries.221  The 
plaintiffs requested that the Court order the IDF to allow medical teams 
and ambulances to reach the wounded in Rafah;222 that electricity and 
water be restored;223 that provision of food and medicine to certain 
neighborhoods be permitted; that medical teams of one of the plaintiff 
organizations be allowed entry into Gaza in order to assess the situation 
there;224 and that an investigation be ordered into the shelling of a crowd 
of protesting civilians that resulted in several deaths.225 
The key question in Physicians for Human Rights is how close to 
actual military conduct courts may intervene without crossing the line 
into the realm of pure military decisionmaking to be left to military 
commanders.  The Court relied on a balancing approach to handle this 
question.226  Moreover, within the area that the Court carved out as 
proper for it to intervene into, it also decided on a balancing 
approach.227 
Like in the Beit Sourik case, the Court in Physicians for Human 
Rights emphasized that it did not question the wisdom of the decision to 
engage in military action.228  Moreover, the Court specified that it 
would refuse to take any position on how the IDF is carrying out armed 
combat so long as soldiers’ lives are in danger.229  But when they are 
not in danger, courts are empowered to review military decisions to 
make sure they comply with applicable law.230  So long as soldiers’ 
lives are in danger, security issues relating to ongoing military 
obligations outweigh liberty interests and humanitarian concerns.231  
Beyond that, however, the security benefits of military action must be 
 
 221 Id. at para. 7. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at para. 77 (Beinisch, J., concurring) (speaking of “a new balance between . . . the fact 
that the Court will not intervene in the combat activity itself, and between the need to ensure, at 
the same time, that combat proceeds according to humanitarian obligations”). 
 227 Id. at para. 19 (stating that “the IDF must act . . . with reasonableness and proportionality”). 
 228 Id. at para. 17 (The Court “presume[s] that the operations in Rafah are necessary from a 
military standpoint.”). 
 229 Id. at paras. 9-10. 
 230 Id. at para. 9. 
 231 Given the factual setting in Physicians for Human Rights, this latter assertion should be 
qualified as follows: because the security involved outweighs the liberties in question, courts 
should refuse to intervene prospectively.  Given the Court’s insistence on the fact that, today, 
wars are subject to law, id. at paras. 13-14, however, the relevant balancing should not be 
construed as barring retrospective judicial intervention to punish unlawful war making. 
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weighed against the harms that such action causes to liberty and dignity 
interests.232 
Consistent with the above distinctions, the Court divides the 
military operations in Rafah into two categories: active combat and 
maintaining order after such combat or during intervals between various 
instances of such combat.  In active combat, soldiers’ lives are highly at 
risk, whereas in the course of maintaining order, they presumably are 
much less so.  In the war on terror, as made manifest in Gaza, however, 
the distinction drawn between combat and maintaining order tends to 
blur.  For example, terrorists, such as members of Islamic Jihad, may 
mix with civilians in a seemingly peaceful crowd233 and then attack 
Israeli soldiers without warning.  Should the Court nevertheless 
continue to treat maintenance of order among civilians differently than 
armed combat?  Or do the particular ways of terrorism justify carving 
out a much greater area of military discretion beyond judicial reach? 
What is even more striking in Physicians for Human Rights is that 
in addition to its intrusion on the military commander’s decisions, the 
Court’s review of the latter’s decision and actions is contemporaneous 
rather than ex post, bringing the Court in on every step of an ongoing 
military mission.  Such simultaneous intervention by the courts makes 
fact gathering, dealing with constantly changing circumstances, and 
evaluating contending assertions particularly difficult.  As stated in the 
concurring opinion, “the difficulty of employing judicial review as 
combat continues reduces the effectiveness of that review and makes 
intervention by the Court difficult.”234 
In the end, the Israeli decisions leave unanswered the following 
questions.  First, is there any cogent way to draw or maintain the 
distinction between zones of military discretion and zones where such 
discretion ought to be balanced against humanitarian concerns?  
Second, even if there were a cogent way to maintain the latter 
distinction, is judicial intervention into day-to-day military operations 
ever justified?  And if not, is there any plausible alternative to 
unmitigated military discretion in the face of an ongoing war on terror? 
For all its insistence that it did not second guess military policy, the 
Israeli Court came close in both Beit Sourik and Physicians for Human 
Rights to engaging in complete de novo review.  In the application of 
the proportionality test “in the narrow sense,” the Court gave some 
deference, but not much, to the military judgment of the relevant IDF 
commander.  In both cases, the Court ordered changes in military 
actions and policies, and in the Physicians for Human Rights case, it 
 
 232 Id. at para. 11. 
 233 See id. at para. 56. 
 234 Id. at para. 77 (Beinisch, J., concurring). 
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actually became an active participant in the ongoing military operation, 
ordering commanders to make changes and adjustments in the midst of 
an active military campaign.  Did the Israeli Court go too far? 
 
IV.     BRITISH PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS AND THE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN TIMES OF CRISIS AND TIMES OF STRESS 
 
Like in the American cases, the main issue in the A(FC) case 
decided by the Law Lords was whether indefinite detention without 
charges of persons suspected of having links to terrorism was 
compatible with fundamental liberty and due process rights.  As viewed 
by the Law Lords, the answer to this question depended on one or both 
of two key considerations: whether the war on terror as gauged from the 
vantage point of the United Kingdom created a state of emergency or 
merely conditions of stress; and, whether different treatment of the 
detainees who were non-deportable foreigners as compared to that of 
otherwise similarly situated deportable foreigners and British nationals 
not subject to deportation violated applicable anti-discrimination 
standards.  Eight of the nine Law Lords found the challenged detentions 
to be in violation of the ECHR and of the 1998 United Kingdom Human 
Rights Act.235 
In reaching their decision, the Law Lords applied a proportionality 
standard to determine whether the war on terror created a state of 
emergency:236 they balanced the detainees liberty interests against the 
nation’s security interests,237 much as the plurality in Hamdi had, and 
they considered whether the different treatment accorded foreign 
suspected terrorists in comparison with domestic ones was 
disproportionate.238  The eight Law Lords who found the challenged 
detentions illegitimate diverged on the precise grounds for their 
conclusions.  There was disagreement over how much deference the 
courts owed Parliament and the Executive,239 over whether the United 
Kingdom’s war on terror was fought under emergency conditions or 
conditions of stress,240 and over whether the challenged detentions were 
 
 235 Lord Walker of Gestingthrope was the lone dissenter.  See A(FC) v. Sec’y of State of the 
Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 166-67 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 236 See id. at 102-03. 
 237 Id. at 160. 
 238 Id. at 142, 144. 
 239 Compare Lord Bingham’s opinion deferring to the Executive on the question of whether, 
on a factual basis, the terrorist threat justified the conclusion that the United Kingdom was in a 
state of emergency, see id. at 102, with Lord Hoffman’s refusal to accord such deference and 
conclusion that there was no such emergency, see id. at 131-32. 
 240 Contrast Lord Hoffman, see id. at 132 (concluding no emergency), with Lord Hope of 
Craighead, see id. at 137-38 (finding the government “fully justified” in its position that “there 
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illegitimate because unduly discriminatory—the prevalent view—or 
because there was no state of emergency—Lord Hoffman’s view.241 
To better grasp the role of proportionality and balancing in the Law 
Lords’ decision, it is first necessary to focus briefly on the key factual 
and legal underpinnings of the case.  After the 9/11 attacks, the British 
Parliament adopted antiterrorist legislation that provides in relevant part 
that “[a] suspected international terrorist may be detained” as someone 
subject to deportation even if he or she cannot be deported due to some 
legal or factual impediment.242  Consistent with this legislation, as 
already mentioned,243 the United Kingdom deported certain foreign 
suspected terrorists to their country of citizenship, but the United 
Kingdom could not do so with respect to others whose deportation 
would have been in violation of United Kingdom obligations under 
international law because of the danger that the would-be deportees 
would be tortured upon their return home.  The latter challenged their 
indefinite detention without charges—which resembled the challenge in 
the American cases but was not equivalent in that the detainees in the 
United Kingdom had always had access to administrative bodies and 
courts for review of the legitimacy of their detention244—under the 
ECHR incorporated into United Kingdom domestic law by the 1998 
Human Rights Act. 
 The relevant provisions of the ECHR were: Article 5, which, as 
mentioned, guarantees the “right to liberty and security of the person” 
and provides basic due process rights to those under arrest;245 Article 
14, which prohibits discrimination with respect to the rights secured by 
the ECHR; and Article 15, which allows a country to derogate from its 
obligations under the ECHR in times of emergency.  Article 15.1 
provides in relevant part: “In time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take 
measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation . . . .”246 
In November 2001, the United Kingdom derogated from its 
obligations under the ECHR citing the September 11th attacks and the 
subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions recognizing those attacks 
as a threat to world peace and security and referring to an existing threat 
 
was an emergency threatening the life of the nation”). 
 241 Id. at 132. 
 242 See id. at 95 (citing Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 49, § 23(1) (Eng.)); 
see also A(FC), 2 A.C. at 91-92. 
 243 See supra pp. 2106-07. 
 244 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 171. 
 245 See European Convention on Human Rights art. 5, §§ 2, 3, and 4, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
 246 European Convention on Human Rights art. 15.1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
(emphasis added). 
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posed by international terrorists against the United Kingdom in which 
foreign nationals within its borders were playing a pivotal role.247 
Within this framework, the key issues were: whether the threat of 
international terrorism was proportionate so as to justify derogation; 
whether, assuming it was, the means used to combat such terrorism 
were the least restrictive possible with respect to the relevant liberty 
(Art. 5) and equality (Art. 14) rights; and who, as between the political 
branches and the courts, had the ultimate power to determine the 
proportionality of derogation.  Moreover, these inquiries had to be 
placed in the context of an overall concern for striking a proper balance 
between liberty and security in the United Kingdom’s war against 
international terror.248 
The standard for derogation, the existence of a state of crisis,249 
was provided by the ECHR and hence, from a domestic standpoint, by 
United Kingdom law itself.250  Furthermore, since derogation must be 
affirmatively instituted by a country, the initial decision and, hence, 
determination of the existence of a state of crisis in the first instance, is 
the responsibility of the political branches.  As mentioned above, the 
Law Lords were divided over whether this determination by the 
political branches was binding on the judiciary.251 
The question of whether it is proper for judges to review the 
proportionality of derogation, which involves deciding whether the 
United Kingdom is actually in a state of crisis, parallels the question of 
the propriety of judicial balancing in the American cases in significant 
respects but with one major difference: under British law, the judiciary 
can declare derogation or the means used to combat the crisis that 
prompted derogation to be contrary to the Human Rights Acts, but it 
cannot order relief or invalidate the challenged laws or executive 
decrees.  It remains up to Parliament to initiate changes or to remain 
with the status quo notwithstanding the judicial declaration.252  As a 
consequence, an erroneous assessment of the balance between liberty 
and security by British judges seems less ominous than one by 
 
 247 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 93-94. 
 248 See id. at 160. 
 249 See supra Part I.C. 
 250 This follows from incorporation of the ECHR through the 1998 Human Rights Act.  See 
supra text accompanying note 82. 
 251 See supra note 239. 
 252 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 170.  There is arguably another noteworthy difference between the 
United States and the United Kingdom, given that the former is a presidential democracy while 
the latter is a parliamentary democracy.  Accordingly, the distinction between executive 
unilateralism and an institutional process-based approach, which figures importantly in the U.S. 
jurisprudence seems much less relevant in the United Kingdom.  Given the focus of the Law 
Lords’ opinions, this latter distinction need not be considered further for present purposes. 
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American judges, since the British Parliament can ignore such an 
assessment whereas the American political branches cannot.253 
It is difficult to assess the import of the fact that the Law Lords 
were divided over their power to review the propriety of derogation 
given that they had a choice to conclude that the challenged detentions 
were illegitimate because derogation was unjustified or because the 
means employed in connection with it were disproportionate as 
violative of the detainees’ ECHR equality rights.  The question of the 
propriety of judicial review of derogation decisions, though perhaps not 
determinative in A(FC), is nonetheless of great importance as it could 
well be determinative in other cases.  For example, had the British 
political branches decided to implement derogation through detention of 
all suspected of having links with foreign terrorism regardless of 
nationality or deportability, then there would have been no plausible 
equality challenge.  In that case, the legitimacy of the detentions would 
turn on whether or not the United Kingdom would be facing conditions 
of crisis. 
This last possibility alone suggests the desirability of judicial 
review of the initial decision leading to derogation.  In the context of the 
A(FC) case, moreover, there were three additional reasons that bolster 
the conclusion that judicial review of the initial political decision was 
desirable and that it could be performed in a principled way.  The first 
reason is that although the United Kingdom faced a similar threat from 
international terrorism as other Western European nations, it was the 
only country to have derogated from its obligations under the ECHR.254  
Even Spain, after the attack perpetrated by Al Qaeda on March 11, 
2004, in Madrid, did not derogate.255  Even if this fact alone should not 
be determinative, and even if significant deference to political decisions 
is warranted, perhaps by granting a rebuttable presumption of validity to 
such decisions, the fact that the United Kingdom was the only one 
among the forty-five members of the Council of Europe to derogate 
from Article 5 of the ECHR raised a serious question at the time 
concerning the conclusion that international terrorism was threatening 
the life of the nation.256 
The second reason is that the United Kingdom did have a period 
within living memory during World War II in which the life of the 
nation was definitely threatened, and as Lord Hoffman pointed out in 
 
 253 This is not to say that a decision by the Law Lords may not result in strong political 
pressure on Parliament to conform the law to the judicial decision.  Nonetheless, from an 
institutional standpoint, Parliament remains free to ignore the judicial decision. 
 254 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 99-101. 
 255 Id. at 100-01. 
 256 See supra notes 31, 246 and accompanying text. 
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the passage cited above,257 the current threat posed by international 
terrorism is nothing comparable.  The threat of international terrorism 
does cause fear, and such fear may lead to exaggeration of the actual 
dangers confronting the citizenry or of the probability that such dangers 
will materialize.258  Precisely because of this, the circumstances 
surrounding derogation should be closely scrutinized, and it seems 
proper for judges to perform that function.259  As Lord Hoffman 
observed, neither the United Kingdom, which had not experienced an 
international terrorist attack at the time A(FC) was handed down, nor 
Spain, which had conducted public affairs as if their institutions were 
threatened or the life of the country was in peril.260  That alone should 
suffice to lift the presumption of validity of the derogation. 
The third reason that buttresses the case for judicial review is that 
the means devised to deal with the threat that supposedly justified 
derogation bolster security minimally if at all.  This suggests that the 
British political branches are not taking the terrorist threat as seriously 
as they claim they are.  To be sure, the mere adoption of discriminatory 
means, even if they must be eventually invalidated because they 
disproportionately trample on equality rights, does not necessary imply 
that the threat sought to be contained is not taken with utmost 
seriousness.  For example, if the overwhelming majority of Al Qaeda 
terrorists and their sympathizers happen to be Muslim, government 
action targeting Muslims would be consistent with taking Al Qaeda’s 
threats seriously, though disproportionate, from the standpoint of 
equality rights.  In contrast, the detention of non-deportable suspected 
foreign international terrorists, but not of such suspected terrorists who 
are British subjects, like Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber,” or of 
deportable foreign suspects who may freely regroup and plan attacks on 
the United Kingdom once back in their own country,261 seems highly 
inconsistent. 
The disproportionate means selected by the United Kingdom 
provide an independent ground for a judicial finding that the challenged 
detentions were illegitimate.  As these means bordered on the 
irrational,262 alternative means that treated all those suspected of having 
links to international terrorism the same would not only have been more 
equitable, but also in all likelihood more efficient and, hence, far more 
 
 257 See supra text accompanying note 31. 
 258 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 136-37. 
 259 Id. at 137. 
 260 Id. at 130-31.  Moreover, that concern is not altered by the July 2005 attacks.  See Ralph 
Frammolino, By Foot or by Bus, Londoners “Get On With It”, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 2005, at A9 
(reporting on the resilience of London commuters after the attacks). 
 261 A(FC), 2 A.C. at 104-05. 
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rational.263  Moreover, focus on the means rather than on the decision to 
derogate arguably has the advantage of confining the judicial role to 
what is clearly a matter of law as opposed to something that is above all 
a matter of politics.264  The Law Lords who thought it inappropriate for 
them to review the political decision to derogate, but entirely legitimate 
for them to review the proportionality of means, thus took a position 
very similar to that of the Israeli Supreme Court in the cases discussed 
above.265  For the Israeli Court, the challenged military actions 
themselves were not subject to judicial review, but their impact on 
Palestinian civilians was. 
In the A(FC) case, because the means were hardly rational, the 
question of means could be kept clearly separate from that of 
derogation.  But what about a case in which the means are rational and 
efficient though clearly discriminatory?  In that situation, it would seem 
that the British judiciary no more that the Israeli Court could neatly or 
cogently sort out questions of law from questions of politics in the 
course of proportionality review.  Nevertheless, in the last analysis, it 
seems less objectionable for judges to review the proportionality of a 
political decision to derogate consistent with standards furnished by the 
ECHR than for judges to review military action deployed in the course 
of active engagement with the enemy. 
There is an additional reason why judicial review of 
proportionality of means with respect to equality is particularly 
important in the context of the current war on terror.  That war arises 
out of an ideological conflict pitting proponents of certain forms of 
radical Islamic fundamentalism against the values that prevail in 
Western democracies.  Under these circumstances, combating terrorism 
by singling out Muslims, or foreigners who for the most part are 
Muslims, seems particularly objectionable in as much as it encourages 
casting Muslims as scapegoats to appease excessive fears stemming 
from an overly susceptible public imagination.  Moreover, not only 
would such scapegoating unfairly trample on the fundamental liberties 
of politically powerless minorities, but it may well also leave most of 
the citizenry indifferent to the injustices involved.266  In contrast, if the 
political branches were confined to imposing non-discriminatory 
 
 263 Detaining all terrorist suspects would overcome objections on equality grounds, but still 
leave the policy vulnerable to challenges on liberty grounds.  As Lord Hoffman emphasized, 
“suspicion of being a supporter [of international terrorism] is one thing and proof of wrongdoing 
is another.”  Id. at 129-30.  Indeed, the policy would be grossly overinclusive and hence 
disproportionately restrictive of liberty if everyone who expressed sympathy for Al Qaeda in a 
discussion overheard in a pub was subject to indefinite detention.  Id. 
 264 This view was that of Lord Bingham of Cornhill.  See id. at 102. 
 265 See supra Part III. 
 266 See Sunstein, supra note 66. 
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restrictions on liberty, it would become much more likely that 
significant portions of the citizenry would politically mobilize against 
them if they seemed excessive or unfair. 
Finally, in many cases involving tradeoffs between increased 
security and decreased liberty in relation to the war on terror, cogent 
and principled judicial balancing of resulting benefits and burdens may 
be difficult to achieve.  In A(FC), however, because the means chosen 
to increase security were so disproportionate, and because the political 
branches’ conclusion that the life of the nation was in peril was so 
tenuous,267 the situation was quite different.  Indeed, it seemed beyond 
reasonable dispute that the increases in security likely to be achieved by 
detention of non-deportable foreign terrorism suspects were far 
outweighed by the burdens imposed on fundamental ECHR rights, 
which apply to foreigners and nationals alike.268  In sum, this 
demonstrates that, in some cases at least, straightforward judicial 
balancing of liberty and security is both feasible and desirable. 
 
V.     ASSESSING AMERICAN BALANCING AND BRITISH AND ISRAELI 
PROPORTIONALITY AS JUDICIAL TOOLS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
 
As seen thus far, American balancing appears too narrow as the 
Court’s Hamdi plurality’s repudiation of executive unilateralism did not 
result in an adequate protection of liberty.269  By the same token, Israeli 
balancing seems too broad, for although in form it professes to leave a 
zone of exclusivity to the executive,270 in practice virtually no military 
action or policy remains beyond the reach of judicial balancing.271  
Finally, it is difficult to gauge the scope of British balancing, given the 
blatant disproportionality of the means used to implement the 
derogation.272  Moreover, the full import of the contrast between the 
respective positions of the three courts cannot be grasped without 
reference to certain contextual factors that had an important bearing on 
how each of them dealt with the cases before it. 
An important difference between the three jurisdictions relates to 
how they respectively chose to place issues arising out of the war on 
 
 267 See A(FC), 2 A.C. at 98-99 (referring to United Kingdom ministerial statements in 2001 
and 2002 indicating a lack of intelligence concerning any immediate terrorist threat against the 
United Kingdom). 
 268 Id. at 113-14. 
 269 See supra Part II. 
 270 The IDF is an administrative body, but it is under the command of the Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defense.  Beit Sourik, supra note 1, para. 23. 
 271 See supra Part III. 
 272 See supra Part IV. 
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terror within one of the three legal paradigms identified above.273  The 
justices in Hamdi were divided into four different legal positions 
ranging from the paradigm of war to that of criminal law.  The position 
of the four justices in the plurality is best viewed as almost fitting 
completely within the paradigm of the law of (conventional) war.  
Indeed, the plurality agreed to the legitimacy of the detention of enemy 
combatants for security reasons for the duration of the hostilities.  Its 
only concession to the unconventional nature of the war on terror was 
that it recognized that, given the unusual nature of the enemy and the 
extraordinary difficulty in pinpointing the end of such a war, risks of 
mistaken detention and of the detentions remaining unnoticed were 
much greater than in the context of ordinary war.  Accordingly, the 
plurality concluded, detainees ought to have a right to challenge their 
status.  But because the plurality was essentially working from a 
paradigm of war, it granted procedural due process rights adequate in 
the context of alleged deprivations of liberty or property in the realm of 
civil, not criminal law.  For anyone who regards Hamdi’s two-year 
detention, which could have plausibly extended for decades, as better 
fitting within a criminal law paradigm, however, the procedural rights 
carved out by the plurality are bound to seem inadequate and 
disproportionate. 
The plurality in Hamdi operated from within a slightly modified 
war paradigm, but only five of the nine justices consistently approached 
all three American cases from the standpoint of a war paradigm.  The 
fifth justice in this group, Justice Thomas, actually dealt with these 
cases strictly from the standpoint of the paradigm of (conventional) war, 
deferring to the President as if Hamdi, Padilla, and the foreign citizens 
from friendly nations detained in Guantanamo were no different than a 
group of German prisoners of war captured in the course of active 
combat against American troops in the North African or European 
theaters of war during World War II.274 
The four remaining justices in Hamdi did not find the procedural 
rights endorsed by the plurality to be sufficient.  Two of these, Justices 
Scalia and Stevens, approached the case squarely from the standpoint of 
the criminal law paradigm275 and would have ordered Hamdi released 
 
 273 See supra Part I.B. 
 274 Justice Thomas dissented in Hamdi because he would not have granted Hamdi the 
procedural rights that the plurality opined he was entitled to.  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 579-81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 275 These justices were prepared to allow for a limited period within which the Government 
could sort out the status of detainees such as Hamdi.  See id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Beyond that period—and two years was well beyond—the Government would either have to 
press criminal charges or release the detainees.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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absent the Government filing criminal charges against him.276  Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg would also have had Hamdi released, although not 
strictly coming from a criminal law paradigm.  Because they found 
Hamdi’s detention wanting due to failings under the process-based 
institutional approach277 and under pertinent international law standards 
applicable to prisoners of war,278 they stood at least for the negative 
proposition that Hamdi’s detention—whether or not he satisfied the 
Government’s definition of “enemy combatant”—could not be fit 
within the war paradigm.  What these two justices left open, however, is 
whether, had the institutional process-based requirements been met, 
they would have still insisted on compliance with the procedural rights 
called for in criminal cases. 
Unlike the American Court, which seems clearly caught between 
two paradigms, the Israeli Court perceives itself as firmly grounded in a 
war paradigm, and a very conventional one for that matter.  The Israeli 
Court was quite explicit that it was applying the law of war and of 
belligerent occupation.279  What is surprising under these circumstances 
is how little deference the Israeli Court has actually given to the 
military.280  Moreover, although the Court specified that the challenged 
military actions involved in the cases discussed above were directed 
against Palestinian terrorism,281 nothing specific to the war on terror 
seems to figure in either the paradigm explicitly embraced by the Court 
or in its actual decisions. 
There is an incongruity between the Israeli Court’s unanimous 
embrace of the war paradigm and its seeming under-weighing of the 
military security objectives at stake in its cases.  Whereas these cases 
concern the rights and interests of Palestinian civilians, the Court also 
stressed that, both in the West Bank and Gaza, terrorists often mingle 
with the civilian population, thus posing a constant hidden and 
unpredictable danger.282  Under these circumstances, the under-
weighing of, or lack of sufficient deference to, military security 
objectives is puzzling unless one hypothesizes that alongside or 
underneath the war paradigm lies a different paradigm. 
This second paradigm is the police power law paradigm.  The 
occupying Israeli military administration is indeed the guarantor of 
 
 276 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 277 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 278 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 549-50 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 279 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 280 See supra Part III. 
 281 See supra Part III. 
 282 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.  The very purpose of the separation barrier was 
to contain terrorism by separating the Palestinian population in the midst of which terrorists were 
easily concealed from the Israeli population that they targeted.  Id. 
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public order and rights in those portions of the occupied territories that 
it controls or substantially affects.  From the standpoint of this second 
paradigm, moreover, the IDF is exercising what amounts to police 
powers vis-à-vis the Palestinian civilians affected by its activities in the 
West Bank and Gaza.  Just as any state bears responsibility for 
maintaining order and providing essential services to its citizenry, the 
IDF as military occupier had similar obligations toward Palestinian 
civilians over whose lives it exercised substantial control.  This police 
power obligation of the IDF is most clearly manifest with respect to the 
situation in Gaza that gave rise to the Physicians for Human Rights 
case.  Indeed, as emphasized by the Court in that case, the IDF had a 
positive obligation toward the Palestinian civilians that included 
providing or guaranteeing essential services, such as food, water, and 
electricity.283  On the other hand, with respect to the Palestinian 
civilians directly affected by the separation barrier in the West Bank, 
the IDF had at least a negative obligation not to disrupt the public order 
or public services more than absolutely necessary.284 
Viewed from the standpoint of the police power law paradigm, 
most of the claims of the Palestinian civilians in the above cases285 
ought to have been treated by the Israeli Court as requiring a balancing 
between what are essentially IDF police power claims286 and what 
substantially amount to Palestinian civilians’ constitutional rights 
claims.  Consistent with this requirement of balancing, the Israeli Court 
would be in the same position as any court confronting constitutional 
cases presenting a conflict between the exercise of state police powers 
and the vindication of fundamental individual rights. 
In the end, the seeming incongruity of the Israeli decisions can be 
traced back to the Court’s concurrent reliance on two separate 
paradigms.  From the standpoint of Israel’s interests and Israeli 
administrative law, the Court was operating under a war paradigm, and, 
hence, its deferential declarations regarding discretion in the pursuit of 
military objectives.287  From the standpoint of the international law of 
belligerent occupation and of its institutional role as guarantor of the 
Palestinian population’s fundamental rights as recognized under 
 
 283 See Physicians For Human Rights, supra note 1, paras. 11-20. 
 284 See discussion of Beit Sourik case supra Part III. 
 285 The claims arising directly out of military combat, such as those pertaining to evacuation of 
the wounded in the Physicians for Human Rights cases, supra note 1, paras. 21-23, do not fit 
within the police power law paradigm. 
 286 In a democracy, police powers are used to foster collective goals that are majoritarian in 
origin.  In an occupation, in contrast, the collective goals involved are not majoritarian, but 
instead imposed by international law.  Nevertheless, in terms of the content of these goals and of 
their clashes with individual rights, the two situations are largely equivalent and hence the police 
power law paradigm can extend to both. 
 287 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
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applicable humanitarian standards, on the other hand, the Court placed 
itself within a police power law paradigm.  Moreover, effectively, given 
the little deference it accorded to military discretion, the Court remained 
principally within the police power law paradigm. 
The Law Lords in A(FC), much like the American Court, seem to 
straddle between the law of war paradigm and the criminal law 
paradigm.  Those Law Lords who agreed that the derogation from 
ECHR rights was warranted because the life of the United Kingdom 
was under threat would undoubtedly have agreed to indefinite detention 
of suspected terrorists were it not for the discriminatory manner in 
which it was being implemented.  On the other hand, as noted above, 
the detainees could challenge their deprivations of liberty before 
administrative bodies and courts, though, unlike criminal suspects, they 
were not entitled to disclosure of information used by the government to 
brand them as suspected terrorists.288 
Unlike in the American cases where the war paradigm may have 
been misused, but where there was an actual foreign war being fought in 
Afghanistan, in the United Kingdom the war paradigm appeared to have 
emerged out of context.  The suspected terrorists detained in the United 
Kingdom had no known connection to any conventional war; only a 
supposed connection to a loose and ill-defined network of terrorists.  
Moreover, the war paradigm, as we have seen, is usually only 
appropriate in times of crisis.289  In contrast, the whole question of the 
legitimacy of derogation, which figures prominently in A(FC), puts into 
question whether the United Kingdom’s war on terror is being fought 
under conditions of crisis.  Assuming, consistent with some views 
among the Law Lords, that it is not being fought under such conditions, 
is the war paradigm still appropriate?  As will be argued below,290 so 
long as the war on terror is fought under conditions of stress rather than 
of crisis, neither the war paradigm nor the criminal law one is likely to 
be adequate. 
The task of determining whether, and to what extent, judicial 
balancing is appropriate in the context of the war on terror is certainly 
complicated by the comparative insights gleaned thus far.  What ought 
to be balanced, and what weight to ascribe to the particular interests to 
be balanced, depends in part on whether one embraces a war, criminal 
law, or police power law paradigm.  It also depends in part on whether 
one deems that the war on terror creates conditions of crisis or 
conditions of stress or even (less likely though not impossibly) ordinary 
conditions. 
 
 288 See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
 289 See supra Part I.B. 
 290 See infra Part V.  
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The first question that consideration of balancing in relation to the 
war on terror poses is whether it would be optimal to rely exclusively on 
extra-judicial balancing.  The advantage of doing so is that it allows for 
bodies with greater expertise and political accountability to weigh 
competing interests rather than relying on courts to do so.  In cases of 
extra-judicial balancing, such as those that arise under the constitutional 
guarantees afforded criminal defendants under the American 
Constitution, courts are limited to categorical determinations.  
Arguably, categorical adjudication is preferable to judicial balancing, 
because it presumably allows for less judicial discretion or judicial 
politics.291 
In spite of the possible benefits of extra-judicial balancing or of 
those of categorical judicial determinations, the preceding analysis 
clearly counsels against doing away with judicial balancing.  For the 
reasons already alluded to in the analysis of the Hamdi case,292 
executive balancing is likely to be skewed owing to that branch’s 
special responsibility for security.293  Furthermore, the institutional 
process-based approach requiring both executive and legislative action 
provides greater safeguards than the executive branch’s acting alone.  
As evinced by the U.S. Congress’s broad delegation of power after 
9/11, by the sweeping powers it granted the Executive by enacting the 
USA PATRIOT Act,294 and by the equally sweeping British legislation, 
however, the latter approach and the additional balancing it promotes do 
not do away with the need for judicial protection of constitutional rights 
or their equivalents.295 
 
 291 This is, in fact, a debatable point.  Certain adjudications seem to bear this point out, but not 
others.  For example, a law that provides that no vehicles are allowed in public parks certainly 
makes for a categorical determination that motorcycles are excluded from parks.  But what about 
motorized wheelchairs?  See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961).  A judge may take 
up that issue categorically, but it may be more fruitful if she were to appeal to balancing.  
Assuming the purpose of the law is quiet enjoyment of the parks by the municipality’s residents, 
is it not better to decide the issue raised by motorized wheelchairs through a balancing process, 
comparing the cost of excluding disabled persons who could not otherwise use the park against 
the benefit of not having the extra noise or movement that motorized wheelchairs would 
inevitably produce?  As this Article argues below, that limitation to categorical judicial action is 
neither desirable nor properly feasible in the context of the war on terror.  See infra text 
accompany note 307.  Thus, it is not necessary to pursue this subject any further. 
 292 See supra Part II. 
 293 The same argument applies, perhaps even more strongly, with respect to the administrative 
power represented by the IDF in the Israeli cases. 
 294 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 295 As parliamentary democracies, rather than presidential ones like the United States, Israel 
and the United Kingdom have less of a separation between legislative and executive power than 
does the United States.  Since this Article argues than even the arguably stronger separation 
prevalent in the United States does not suffice to adequately protect rights in the war on terror, 
separation of powers differences between the three countries can be left aside for present 
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To better appreciate this last point, it may be useful to look at the 
alternative offered by a categorical approach such as that found in 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hamdi.  That approach would not have been 
appropriate for the Israeli cases dealing with substantive rights of 
civilians.  Indeed, a categorical approach to substantive rights provides 
too blunt a tool to allow for as much enjoyment of such rights as 
compatible with the state’s realization of its vital security needs.  
Furthermore, even under the assumption that a categorical approach is 
unequivocally superior with respect to the procedural rights of criminal 
defendants, Justice Scalia’s approach seems too rigid in the context of 
the war on terror.  Because Hamdi’s plight was similar to that of a 
criminal suspect, and because the plurality in Hamdi gave too much 
weight to the government’s security interests,296 a categorical approach 
may seem to have been superior in the context of that case.  But the 
numerous other kinds of situations in which liberty and security are 
bound to clash in the war on terror will inevitably be varied and 
different.  Accordingly, the more flexible balancing approach would be 
better.  For example, even under the circumstances surrounding 
Padilla’s detention, and assuming that after two years of detention 
proper judicial balancing would grant him essentially the same rights as 
those of a criminal defendant, there may still be a need for flexibility.  
Thus, if the Government arrested Padilla on the basis of intelligence it 
could not reveal, it might be appropriate to allow it to introduce hearsay 
testimony or present secret evidence in camera allowing for review and 
challenge by the judge but not by the detainee’s counsel. 
Balancing affords greater flexibility, but is it reliable?  Can it be 
made to conform to standards?  Or, does balancing in the end rest solely 
on the unfettered discretion of judges?  To circumscribe this question 
more narrowly, assuming that balancing can work satisfactorily in areas 
other than the war on terror,297 are there special problems or issues 
pertaining to that latter area? 
 
purposes. 
 296 See supra p. 2120. 
 297 This assumption is, of course, highly debatable given the many problems identified with 
respect to balancing.  See Aleinikoff, supra note 41.  Even under the best circumstances, using 
judicial balancing is unlikely to lead to a single right result for every case.  However, although the 
result produced by means of balancing may be indeterminate for any complex or controversial 
issue, so too can be the result reached through a categorical or any other interpretive approach.  
For a theoretical discussion of the problems of indeterminacy in legal interpretation, see MICHEL 
ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS, at ch. 1 (1998).  For 
present purposes, suffice it to note that the balancing approach in the United States, such as 
review of racial classifications under a strict scrutiny test, see supra note 49, and the 
proportionality test used in many constitutional democracies elsewhere, can lead to fairly 
consistent, reasonable and fair results.  It is this potential of balancing under ordinary 
circumstances that will serve here as a baseline. 
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In all genuine war-on-terror conflicts between security and 
fundamental rights, both the government objectives involved and the 
rights at stake are bound to be of great importance.  Consistent with this 
fact, the respect in which these terms ought to be weighed against one 
another can be satisfied by application of the derogation standards of 
Article 15 of the ECHR in force in the United Kingdom, the American 
strict scrutiny test, the Israeli tripartite proportionality test, or something 
equivalent. 
The weighing operation itself differs according to whether one 
operates under the United Kingdom standard, the American strict 
scrutiny test, or the Israeli proportionality test.  Under the ECHR Article 
15 standard in force in the United Kingdom, and under American strict 
scrutiny, once the relevant government objective is judicially or 
otherwise decreed as being sufficiently weighty—i.e., as meeting a 
threat to the life of the nation in the United Kingdom, or as being 
“compelling” in the United States—that objective is not subjected to 
any further balancing or scrutiny.  The focus then shifts to the 
governmental means deployed to achieve the objective in question and 
the “weighing” is confined to such means.298  For example, assume 
Hamdi had claimed that it violated his substantive liberty rights to be 
detained as an enemy combatant, rather than challenging his designation 
as such.  In that case, if the Government’s claims that neutralizing those 
fighting the United States on the side of the terrorists and preventing 
them from rejoining the enemy before the end of hostilities were 
deemed compelling, then the designation of enemy combatants and 
preventing them from returning to battle would no longer be open for 
discussion or further balancing.  What would remain under the strict 
scrutiny test would be determining whether means less drastic than 
imprisonment—e.g., wearing an electronic device allowing constant 
Government monitoring—would be equally likely to lead to satisfaction 
of the desired government objective.299 
The third subtest of the Israeli proportionality test, on the other 
hand, does provide for further discussion and balancing of government 
 
 298 Formally as we have seen, the question is one of “fit” between means and ends.  See supra 
Part I.C.  Substantively, however, “fit” means that pursuit of a compelling state interest only 
outweighs a conflicting right in so far as the injury to that right caused by such pursuit is no 
greater than absolutely necessary. 
 299 Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where the court applied strict 
scrutiny and found internment of Japanese-Americans in detention camps during World War II 
constitutional as it accepted the claim of the American military that the danger of a Japanese 
invasion of the U.S. West Coast would be greatly enhanced by availability of a potential fifth 
column living throughout the West Coast.  That claim, though eventually proven false, see 
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984), remained unquestioned by the 
Korematsu majority in 1944. 
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objectives that seem “compelling” by American standards.300  Thus, in 
Beit Sourik, the Israeli Court accepted the “compelling” need for a 
separation barrier to stem the flow of terrorist attacks against Israeli 
civilians.301  Yet, in applying the third subtest of the Israeli 
proportionality test, the Court compared the particular separation barrier 
pursued by the IDF in the good faith belief that it would maximize 
security to a proposed alternative that may have led to somewhat 
lessened security but would have significantly reduced the injuries to 
the rights and interests of affected Palestinian civilians.  And on the 
basis of that comparison, the Court held the IDF barrier to be 
disproportionate.302  In short, unlike in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, where state objectives are weighed against an objective 
standard, in Israel, similar state objectives are weighed against one 
another to determine which among them is most proportionate.303 
The Israeli proportionality test makes for significantly more 
intrusive judicial intervention into policy, including military policy, 
than does the American strict scrutiny test or the British proportionality 
standard.304  This difference is important and it must be kept in mind 
while considering whether balancing is appropriate or desirable in cases 
involving military affairs.  More specifically, the question that needs to 
be addressed in relation to this latter difference between the American 
and the Israeli approach—which may be conveniently referred to as a 
difference between “balancing means” and “balancing ends”—is 
whether the Israeli approach goes too far, and if it does, whether that is 
due to lack of judicial expertise in weighing military policy or to the 
conclusion that such weighing is impolitic and potentially damaging to 
the judiciary’s institutional interests. 
 
 300 Whereas the Israeli proportionality test differs from the American strict scrutiny test, in 
both countries protecting the citizenry in the face of terror is among the weightiest government 
objectives.  See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 301 See supra note 70. 
 302 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 303 Since the nexus between means and ends is a relational one, the IDF barrier and the 
Council proposed barrier in Beit Sourik may be regarded as means to the more abstract end of the 
country’s security in general rather than as ends in themselves as two contending concrete 
embodiments of a particular type of security.  Ultimately, the level of abstraction at which a given 
government objective should be set ought to be determined by practical considerations.  For 
present purposes, suffice it to note that even if the separation barrier is taken as the means, and 
the country’s security in general as the end, there would still be some balancing with respect to 
ends.  This follows from the proportionality test’s third subtest, which leads to the conclusion that 
a somewhat less secure but significantly less injurious barrier than the IDF’s would be more 
proportionate. 
 304 If the British standard is interpreted as requiring judicial review of a political determination 
that the nation is in a state of crisis, it would more closely approximate the Israeli standard than 
the American. 
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There are strong arguments against courts weighing ends in such a 
way that squarely thrusts them into policy-making—a power 
constitutions generally grant to legislative and administrative bodies.305  
Assuming, nonetheless, that such balancing is institutionalized in a 
particular country, is there any reason to single out military policy for 
exemption from judicial balancing? 
In terms of lack of judicial expertise, military policy seems no 
different than environmental, economic, or police policy aimed to 
securing public order.  Moreover, whether or not balancing of ends is 
considered appropriate, it is difficult to see how courts could avoid 
balancing means in the context of military affairs.  For example, 
suppose that once the separation barrier is completed it were to cut off 
two West Bank villages from one another but would allow for passage 
through doors from one village to the other.  Suppose further that the 
IDF refuses all passage to Palestinians for reasons of military security.  
In a putative suit by Palestinians who live in one of the villages and 
want to visit relatives in the other, any court using a standard akin to the 
American strict scrutiny test would have to determine if the total ban is 
necessary in order to accomplish the IDF’s military security objectives.  
And such determination would require a factual inquiry into whether 
any easing of the IDF’s total ban on passage would be possible without 
reducing the level of security provided by the total ban. 
The relevant difference between military policy and other policies 
such as environmental policy, for example, is that the former requires 
much more secrecy than the latter, and that military issues may have a 
different kind of political sensitivity than environmental or most other 
non-military issues.  Indeed, military affairs tend to have foreign as well 
as domestic implications, and a serious impact on national security and 
diplomacy. 
From the standpoint of inter-institutional balancing, therefore, it is 
preferable to avoid or greatly limit judicial balancing of ends in general, 
and especially in the realm of military policy.  Moreover, although 
balancing of means generally is crucial from an inter-institutional 
standpoint,306 certain precautionary limitations with little substantial 
effect on affected fundamental rights should be permissible in the 
context of military affairs.  For example, greater tolerance of hearsay 
evidence, or recourse to in camera review to preserve confidentiality of 
 
 305 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I (Legislative powers granted to Congress) and II (Executive 
powers delegated to President); 1958 French Constitution, art. 34 (Parliament makes laws); 
German Basic Law, arts. 70-78 (Parliament and Government make federal law). 
 306 See discussion supra p. 2112 (indicating that a purely process-based institutional approach 
would insufficiently protect fundamental rights). 
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sensitive military information, ought to be allowed even if that would 
slightly weaken actual protection of fundamental rights. 
In the last analysis, there ought to be no automatic ban on judicial 
balancing of ends.  In some cases, as the discussion of the A(FC) 
indicated, judicial balancing of ends may be both clearly feasible and 
desirable.307  Even in the military context, there may be rare cases where 
no other institutional balancing of security and rights takes place at all 
and where, accordingly, fundamental rights would be left completely 
unprotected absent judicial balancing.  In the remaining cases, however, 
judicial balancing of ends should be avoided and balancing of means 





VI.     CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: BALANCING AND TERROR 
 
Though judicial balancing should not be eliminated in cases arising 
from the war on terror, its shortcomings, which have emerged in the 
course of the preceding analysis, call for a determination of whether it is 
possible to structure and guide such balancing so as to minimize 
unsatisfactory outcomes.  Should that be impossible, use of judicial 
balancing would still be preferable to its abandonment, but its benefits 
would remain modest and unpredictable. 
To explore how judicial balancing may be optimized, it is useful to 
start from the six cases examined above, to postulate what would have 
been the most desirable outcome for each of them and to determine 
what institutional mechanisms, contextual references, and judicial 
techniques would have been instrumental in stirring the process toward 
the desired outcome.  The desirable outcome in Hamdi and Padilla 
seems obvious and has been mentioned extensively in the preceding 
discussion: both Hamdi and Padilla should have been granted the rights 
that are substantively equivalent to the due process rights accorded 
criminal defendants, with flexibility concerning the means of 
effectuating such rights to accommodate military and intelligence 
concerns relating to the war on terror.308  With respect to particulars, the 
circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s detention are different from those 
pertaining to Padilla.  The Government’s case against Hamdi seemed 
weak (otherwise, he could have been prosecuted like Lindh)309 and his 
 
 307 See supra Part IV. 
 308 See supra Part II. 
 309 See supra note 160. 
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release would and did pose little danger.310  With respect to Padilla, on 
the other hand, it is not clear whether the Government never had 
sufficient evidence to prosecute him, had sufficient evidence but could 
not prosecute him without revealing sensitive intelligence, or whether, 
as it now appears, it had a weak case against him much like it did 
against Hamdi.  This could be clarified in a hearing in which the 
Government would have the burden of proof, but where sensitive 
information could be, if necessary, only disclosed to the judge, without 
giving access to it to Padilla or his counsel.  This latter possibility 
amounts to a departure in substance, and not only form, from the due 
process rights of criminal defendants.  This departure would be 
proportionate, however, as it would strike a balance between the 
Government’s security needs and Padilla’s liberty interests.  Involving 
the judge in the determination of the relevant contested issues would 
secure the institutional benefit of a judicial decision though without the 
usual added protections of the adversarial process, which makes for 
confrontation by the detainee’s counsel.311  Moreover, the difference in 
treatment between Padilla and Hamdi advanced here is also justified in 
relation to the gravity of the respective threats that these two individuals 
were accused of posing against the United States.  Hamdi was, at worst, 
yet one more soldier in a ground war in Afghanistan; Padilla, in 
contrast, was once alleged to be a terrorist plotting a devastating attack 
that could claim hundreds of thousands of lives and destroy the world’s 
most important financial center.312 
Because Rasul, like Padilla, was disposed of on threshold grounds, 
the fate of the Guantanamo detainees was not examined in any detail by 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  Since the Court’s decision, some Guantanamo 
detainees have been charged, and trials before military commissions 
have started;313 some detainees have been released;314 and some 
 
 310 It is noteworthy in this respect that shortly after the Supreme Court decision, the 
Government began negotiating for Hamdi’s release rather than undertaking further litigation.  See 
Philip Shenon, U.S. Signals End to Legal Fight Over an ‘Enemy Combatant’, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 
13, 2004, at A10.  Shortly thereafter, Hamdi was returned to Saudi Arabia.  See supra note 160. 
 311 If this is indeed the most proportionate outcome under the relevant circumstances, it 
illustrates why Justice Scalia’s categorical approach expressed in Hamdi is too blunt a tool in the 
war on terror. 
 312 Imagining the devastation caused by a dirty bomb is an unspeakable horror.  A proper 
judicial assessment in a case such as Padilla’s would have to gauge the probability of such a 
bomb being successfully detonated in a city like New York or Chicago.  If that probability turned 
out to be infinitesimally small, a judge should not skew balancing due to virtually purely 
imaginary horrors.  See infra notes 333-334 and accompanying text for further discussion of the 
role of imagination in the war on terror. 
 313 See Sebastiaan Gottlieb, First Trial Starts at Guantanamo, Aug. 24, 2004, RENSE.COM, 
http://rense.com/general56/fufut.htm. 
 314 See, e.g., Gitmo Detainees Return to France, CNN.COM, July 27, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/07/27/france.gitmo/index.html. 
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detainees were ruled enemy combatants in a review process organized 
by the Pentagon in response to the Court’s decision.315  A suit 
challenging the above mentioned military commissions is now pending 
before the Court.316  In terms of an optimal result, the Guantanamo 
detainees should be granted procedural rights within the spectrum lying 
between the rights recommended for Hamdi and those recommended for 
Padilla. 
Beyond these procedural rights, all three cases raise important 
substantive rights issues that for the most part were not addressed by the 
Court.  The plurality in Hamdi did hold that the Executive Branch may 
detain enemy combatants until the end of hostilities, thus treating them 
like prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions.317  This holding, 
however, which has the support of a bare majority of the justices,318 
raises more questions than it answers.  Leaving aside relevant issues of 
international law that are beyond the scope of this Article, while the 
Hamdi plurality’s conception of an “enemy combatant” is roughly 
equivalent to the conception of a “prisoner of war” under the Geneva 
Conventions, the Pentagon has taken the position that enemy 
combatants may be held indefinitely without charges.319 
 
 315 See Detainees Ruled Enemy Combatants, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2004, at A09. 
 316 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 622 (2005) (mem.) (granting certiorari on whether the 
commissions are statutorily authorized by statute or by the President’s inherent powers and 
whether petitioner may judicially enforce his rights under the Geneva Conventions via habeas 
corpus petition).  A panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had held in July 2005 
that the commissions were authorized by Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force, that 
the Geneva Conventions conferred no private enforcement right of action, and that, 
notwithstanding, the commissions did not violate any rights under the Geneva Conventions.  
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  In December 2005, Congress passed the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which vests exclusive authority to hear habeas appeals from 
Guantanamo detainees in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court.  
28 U.S.C.S. § 2241(e) (LexisNexis 2005).  The Bush Administration has since moved to dismiss 
detainee challenges already filed before passage of that act, including Hamdan’s, for want of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Dan Eggen & Josh White, U.S. Seeks to Avoid Detainee Ruling, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at A07.  In a press release, Senator Carl Levin, one of the co-authors 
of the legislation, has disputed the administration’s attempts to apply it retroactively to pending 
cases.  Press Release, Sen. Carl Levin, Levin Statement on Administration Announcement it Will 
Seek Dismissal of Guantanamo Lawsuits (Jan. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/~levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=250235 (“‘Congress specifically 
considered and rejected language that would have applied the Graham-Levin amendment 
retroactively to pending cases.’”) 
 317 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without 
delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”). 
 318 The fifth justice in support is Justice Thomas, who endorsed the Administration’s position 
on the subject.  See supra note 106. 
 319 See Detainees Ruled Enemy Combatants, supra note 315.  Faced by challenges from 
human rights organizations, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announced in 2004 that the case of 
every detainee in Guantanamo will be reviewed once a year to determine if he is a security threat 
to the United States.  See id. 
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Ideally, the category of “enemy combatant” ought to be eliminated 
or greatly limited in scope.  This category fits well within the paradigm 
of war so long as “enemy combatant” is roughly synonymous with 
“prisoner of war.”  But the war on terror, as we have seen and will 
discuss further below,320 cannot be encapsulated within the war 
paradigm.  The war on terror is, at least in part, like the war on crime, a 
constant struggle with varying degrees of intensity, but without any 
final outcome.  To the extent that the war on terror fits within the 
criminal law paradigm, the potential lifelong detention of an enemy 
combatant without the filing of any charges, let alone conviction of a 
crime, seems grossly disproportionate and easily prone to abuse.  For 
that reason, for some of those detained as enemy combatants, such as 
Padilla, who have not been detained at or near a theater of war, the label 
of enemy combatant ought to be dropped altogether.  Because the war 
on terror is not merely a part of the war on crime, someone like Padilla 
should be subject to detention without charges for a reasonably brief 
period, to allow the Government to interrogate him and to neutralize 
him while it tries to round up confederates, dismantle cells or 
successfully thwart an ongoing terrorist operation.  After this initial 
period, the detainee should be criminally charged or released.321 
For someone like Hamdi or many of the Guatanamo prisoners who 
were detained at or near a theater of war, on the other hand, the status of 
enemy combatant may be adequate so long as it remains coextensive 
with that of prisoners of war.  Also, to prevent abuses based on the 
linkage of a war that had the trappings of a conventional war, such as 
the war in Afghanistan with war on terror, any detainee labeled an 
enemy combatant should be either released or charged with a crime 
upon cessation of the hostilities conducted in the manner of a 
conventional war. 
Turning to the Israeli cases, it seems clear that their principal 
shortcoming was the Court’s failure to give adequate weight to military 
security determinations.322  It is difficult, however, to ascertain what 
would have been the optimal result in these cases.  In Beit Sourik, if the 
security differences between the IDF’s separation fence and that of the 
Council were indeed “minute” as the Court found, then the actual result 
may come close to the optimal one.  What remains problematic then, is 
the way the Court reached that result.  Although the Court professed to 
give deference to military expertise, it in substance engaged in de novo 
 
 320 See infra pp. 2153-56. 
 321 As terrorism is likely to take unanticipated forms, judges should be empowered to extend 
the initial period of detention without charges upon the government proving it has a compelling 
need for such extension. 
 322 See supra Part III. 
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balancing.323  The question this raises, therefore, is whether the Court 
could have reached the same result by relying on better judicial means. 
In Physicians for Human Rights it is also difficult to assess what 
would have been the optimal result.  It may have also been the one 
reached by the Court, though if that led to a significant increase in 
deaths and injuries among Israeli soldiers, then it would be an 
undesirable result.  Indeed, balancing security and liberty in military 
operations involving issues of life and death should be left to the 
military so long as it undertakes its responsibilities legally, competently, 
and in good faith.324  Moreover, as the Court itself noted, it was 
reaching the “outer limits of the judiciary,”325 by intervening in day-to-
day military operations as they were unfolding.  One could argue that 
the Court actually went beyond those limits as it acted more as a 
mediator between the IDF and Palestinian civilians than as an 
adjudicator.  This raised the question of whether it is possible to find a 
more suitable alternative that would preserve the benefits of oversight 
over the military, where appropriate, without the judiciary’s unduly 
trampling on military operations or becoming involved in day-to-day 
decision-making.326 
As already emphasized, the result reached by the Law Lords in 
A(FC) is clearly the right one.327  Accordingly, it would be impossible 
to improve on the actual outcome of the case.  On the other hand, the 
road to that outcome is confusing due to the possibility of invalidation 
of the challenged detention scheme on two alternative grounds: 
improper derogation or disproportionate means.  This choice between 
alternatives not only allowed for murky reasoning regarding whether the 
United Kingdom was in a state of crisis, but also permitted obscuring 
the important issue of whether the judiciary should defer to the political 
branches in the determination of whether a state of crisis exists.328 
Optimally, derogation decisions should be judicially reviewable in 
terms of the distinction between a state of crisis and conditions of stress.  
As we have seen, in relation to A(FC), criteria for such review existed, 
and even factoring in a presumption of validity for a political branch 
decision to derogate, the British war on terror did not create crisis 
 
 323 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 324 The Court did state that it deferred to the military so long as soldiers’ lives were in danger.  
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.  In view of the ongoing terrorist threat with terrorists 
hiding within civilian crowds, see supra note 233 and accompanying text, it is arguable that it is 
impossible to separate parts of the Gaza military operation involved that pose risks to soldiers’ 
lives from other parts that do not. 
 325 See supra note 216. 
 326 One possibility would be to entrust this mediator responsibility to a non-judiciary body 
supervised by the courts. 
 327 See supra Part IV. 
 328 See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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conditions.329  It did create conditions of stress, which though not 
warranting wholesale derogation from fundamental rights, may 
nonetheless justify discrete limitations on particular rights that may be 
somewhat more extensive than those found permissible in ordinary 
times. 
All the problems discussed thus far arise in substantial part because 
the legal issues that emerge from the war on terror do not fit neatly 
within any of the three existing legal paradigms discussed throughout.  
Moreover, all the suggested optimal results presented above involve 
some shift in paradigm.  Consistent with this, it seems appropriate to 
adopt a new paradigm, the “war-on-terror law paradigm.”  This new 
paradigm incorporates aspects of the three other paradigms but recasts 
the relationships among them.  The war-on-terror law paradigm also 
accounts for the tensions that pit conditions of stress against conditions 
of crisis. 
The war-on-terror law paradigm is conceived as a dynamic one, 
evolving and adapting to the needs and problems of the war on terror.  
Its contours are defined by the contextual shifts produced by 
contemporary terrorism and by the reactions mounted against it.  The 
war on terror is in many ways different from ordinary war.  It is 
different in terms of the enemy it confronts, of how it is fought, of the 
dangers it poses, and of its duration.  Whereas conventional wars are 
generally limited in duration, the war on terror must be conceived as a 
war without end.330  This, in turn, should have a strong bearing on how 
extraordinary powers are conceived and institutionalized in the context 
of the war on terror.  In the context of a conventional war of limited 
duration, emergency powers can be conceived and implemented as 
temporary extraordinary measures.  In the war on terror extraordinary 
measures must be conceived as permanent, and as such require a 
different and more careful balancing of security and rights—one that is 
tailored to the concerns of times of stress rather than to the exigencies of 
times of crisis.  Had this difference been taken into account, it might 
definitely have caused the result in Hamdi to come closer to the optimal 
result described above.331 
Various references have been made above to the important role 
that imagination plays in shaping our conception of terrorism and of the 
nature and likelihood of the threats it poses for society.332  It was also 
noted that imagination plays a larger part in shaping American and 
 
 329 See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 330 Whether, in fact, the war on terror will come to a clear end such as the two world wars did 
is of course impossible to predict. 
 331 See supra pp. 2149-50. 
 332 See supra pp. 2103, 2138 and note 66 and accompanying text. 
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British conceptions of terror than it does in shaping Israeli ones.333  
Whereas it is important not to lack imagination sufficient to prompt 
adequate preparation to defend and protect against terrorism, 
exaggerated and unlimited imagination can lead to skewed balancing 
and undue suppression of civil liberties. 
By its very nature, terrorism is intended to cause fear, panic and 
insecurity to a degree that is often disproportionate to the damage 
inflicted or the real danger posed.334  To be sure, some of the imaginable 
acts of terrorism, such as dirty bombs or biological or chemical 
contamination, could cause mass disasters.  Others, such as suicide 
bombings or truck-bombing incidents, may cause only dozens of 
casualties, certainly an unacceptable toll and nothing to be taken lightly, 
but something much smaller than the casualties suffered in conventional 
wars.335  It is important for the institutions of government, including the 
judiciary, not to be swayed by the most frightening imaginary scenarios 
without first inquiring into the feasibility or probability of particular 
kinds of acts of terror.336  Otherwise, both inter-institutional and judicial 
balancing will inevitably become skewed. 
The Israeli cases underscore the importance of including elements 
of the police power law paradigm in the war-on-terror law paradigm.  
Whereas it is true that the Israeli situation is rather unique given its 
occupation of Palestinian territory, to the extent that the problems raised 
by the separation barrier and aspects of the military occupation in Gaza 
can be genuinely regarded as “internal,” its implications are quite far 
reaching.  Indeed, the war on terror seems often bound to require 
imposing restrictions and burdens on a country’s own citizens.  And 
often, as in the case of the Arab-American community in the United 
States after 9/11, such burdens fall disproportionately on particular 
minorities.337  It is accordingly important to remember that even in 
 
 333 See supra p. 2103. 
 334 Even schemes involving dirty bombs, poisoning of water supplies, biological and chemical 
warfare and other horrors frequently associated with terrorism would not cause any danger 
comparable to mutual nuclear annihilation.  See supra p. 2087.  Yet because of the random, 
arbitrary, and unpredictable quality of terrorism, it is prone to causing greater panic than the 
constant nuclear threat did during the Cold War. 
 335 In the Yom Kippur War fought during seventeen days Israel suffered 2,523 casualties, see 
Peter Colón, The Yom Kippur War: A Nation Caught By Surprise, The Friends of Israel Gospel 
Ministry, Inc., http://sites.silaspartners.com/partner/Article_Display_Page/0,,PTID306608 
|CHID556136|CIID1397306,00.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006), as compared to the nine hundred 
it suffered from terrorism from 2000 to April 2004.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 336 See Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, The Wednesday 
Report, http://www.thewednesdayreport.com/twr/CBRN.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (stating 
that the “popular scenario involving poisoning the water supply of a major metropolitan area does 
not appear very feasible” and that use of many chemical or biological agents would depend on a 
perfect combination of various atmospheric conditions to be successful). 
 337 See, e.g., Muslims, Arabs Bracing for Discrimination, RELIGIONLINK.ORG, Feb. 24, 2003, 
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countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, where recent 
terrorism is not connected to a conventional war or boundary dispute, 
the war on terror does not merely fall within the war and criminal law 
paradigms. 
Assuming that the results in the Israel cases are the optimal ones, 
suggesting ways to circumvent the danger of judicial overreaching 
seems particularly difficult.  It is clear that judicial intrusions into 
military policy and action, even if not absolutely barred, ought to be few 
and far between.  The Israeli Court’s intervention was seemingly 
inevitable as it was prompted by the need to avoid leaving a legal 
vacuum.338  Under different circumstances, however, it seems preferable 
to curtail the scope of judicial balancing either through the 
administrative process, if the military carries out the law-and-order 
function, or through legislation, if civilian authorities do. 
Some of the tasks enumerated above for purposes of closing the 
gap between the actual court decisions and the suggested optimal 
outcomes, such as clarification of the category of “enemy combatant,” 
are better left to legislators.  Other tasks can be entrusted to judicial 
balancing as properly circumscribed within the emerging paradigm of 
the war on terror.  This will inevitably involve some experimentation 
and some discretion to choose among various open paths.  This does not 
mean that judicial balancing in the area need be unconstrained or 
undisciplined.  Given a commonality of values and objectives when it 
comes to the war on terror, and given that successful judicial balancing 
requires openness toward all plausible positions,339 it is quite possible 
that a cogent, fair, and balanced jurisprudence on the war of terror will 
emerge.  We are at the beginning of this process, and hopefully 
development of the new legal paradigm of the war on terror will provide 





 338 Indeed, absent intervention by Israeli courts, aggrieved Palestinian civilians would, as a 
practical matter, have no legal recourse for violations of their humanitarian rights. 
 339 Cf Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1976) (“Adoption of the balancing standard . . . commits 
[judges] to the [Supreme] Court’s and the country’s project of resolving normative disputes by 
conversation . . . .”). 
